Is It the End of the Saga for Imran Khan?

The sentence, delivered in a case in which Mr. Khan is accused of leaking state secrets, came about a week before Pakistan is set to head to the polls for the first national election since he was ousted in a vote of no confidence in April 2022.

by Kazi Anwarul Masud

 

February 3, 2024

 

6 mins read

 

Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) Chairman Imran Khan. [File Photo]

HAS THE SAGA OF IMRAN KHAN ENDED?

Finally, the curtain appears to have been pulled down on the drama enacted by the Pakistan army on the most popular politician alive by sentencing him to ten years imprisonment. Former Prime Minister Imran Khan of Pakistan was sentenced to 10 years in prison the latest twist in what is widely seen as a campaign by the military to sideline one of its leading critics. The sentence, delivered in a case in which Mr. Khan is accused of leaking state secrets, came about a week before Pakistan is set to head to the polls for the first national election since he was ousted in a vote of no confidence in April 2022. Analysts have called the election among the least credible in Pakistan’s 76-year history because of the military’s widespread crackdown on Imran Khan and his supporters. His ouster set off a political showdown between Mr. Khan, 71, and the powerful military — long the invisible hand guiding the country’s politics — that has left Pakistan in crisis for a year and a half. Mr. Khan and his supporters have accused military leaders of orchestrating his removal — an accusation they deny.  

IS REVOLT AGAINST THE GENERALS POSSIBLE?

Imran Khan and his backers have railed against the country’s generals, his popularity has remained high, and public anger at the military has swelled. In May, hundreds of protesters attacked military installations in scenes that were once unimaginable in Pakistan.  The New York Times reports that the sentence, delivered in a case in which Imran   Khan is accused of leaking state secrets, came about a week before Pakistan is set to head to the polls for the first national election since he was ousted in a vote of no confidence in April 2022. Analysts have called the election among the least credible in Pakistan’s 76-year history because of the military’s widespread crackdown on Imran Khan and his supporters. His ouster set off a political showdown between Imran  Khan, 71, and the powerful military — long the invisible hand guiding the country’s politics — that has left Pakistan in crisis for a year and a half. Mr. Khan and his supporters have accused military leaders of orchestrating his removal — an accusation they deny.

PAKISTAN WILL NOT BE ABLE TO BRING MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT UNDER CIVILIAN CONTROL

An unnamed analyst (from Quora) expressed his opinion that Pakistan is not going to be able to bring the military establishment firmly under the control of a democratically elected civilian government anytime soon. Some people tend to underestimate just how much influence the Pakistani military possesses within the country. This influence extends to almost everything in one form or another. Let’s look at the military-owned or affiliated private businesses for example. Such as the Fauji Foundation Company, which is involved in everything from fertilizers to food products to banking to construction to energy and much more. Or Banks, such as Askari Bank, one of the largest banks in Pakistan with hundreds of branches. Or the housing societies (DHA, Askaris, etc) and construction companies. Or educational facilities and institutes from the kindergarten to university level. And pretty much any other form of trade or business. Reports from a few years back indicated that the military probably owns more than seven percent of all private assets and twelve percent of land. Then there is the fact that important aspects of the state are directly controlled or heavily influenced by the military establishment. Pakistan’s intelligence (ISI) for example is under the control of the military. Or the 111th Infantry Brigade, which is responsible for providing security to the Prime Minister, President, and other government officials. But is also used by the military establishment in coups against democratically elected Prime Ministers.

DID THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT MAKE A MISTAKE BY ACTING TOO EARLY AGAINST IMRAN KHAN?

The unnamed analyst felt that the military establishment made a mistake by acting too early against Imran Khan. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the 9th Prime Minister of Pakistan, was also removed from power in a military coup (and later executed) after a loss of popularity and widespread discontent. It should be clear by now that the influence of the military extends into almost every aspect of the country. The tentacles of the military have spread everywhere. There is no simple or easy solution to this now pervasive influence that extends into almost everything. We have seen time and again what happens when a Prime Minister tries to challenge the influence of the military establishment. Nawaz Sharif tried to influence or intervene in military matters and was removed from power in 2017.

The military establishment allied with his opposition (Imran Khan and the PTI) and helped raise the party to power. And now the same happened to Imran Khan when he tried to intervene in military appointments. The same old powers (Sharifs and Bhuttos) now once again forming an alliance with the establishment to be used against Imran Khan. It has also prevented the maturation of the political system and resulted in a very volatile or fragile political landscape. It is hard to say whether this political instability was intentional or an accidental outcome. Imran Khan is now 71 years old and if he has to serve out his sentence of ten years, he will be too old regardless of his popularity as the army is not expected to relinquish its power in Pakistan.

RETURN OF NAWAZ SHARIF WITH ARMY BLESSINGS

The very fact that the PML-N of Nawaz Sharif has been pardoned by the judiciary for alleged crimes for which he had to spend decades in England is proof that Nawaz Sharif had to come to terms with the army for his return to power. Famous British Journal The Economist reported that Pakistan’s most popular politician, with a legion of committed activists and no fear of the army,  Imran Khan looked odds-on to win a general election.  Barely three weeks later, the political walls have caved in on him. The generals have in effect dismantled the party Khan founded in 1996, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI). Scores of its senior leaders have defected and thousands of its supporters have been arrested. The government of Shehbaz Sharif is openly mulling banning the party.  Khan, who faces dozens of charges including corruption and blasphemy, could be tried by a military court—and perhaps expect a long political exile at best. Pakistan’s beleaguered civilian institutions appear, for now, to be firmly back under the army’s sway. Whether under orders from the military or out of sheer opportunism, the government of Shehbaz Sharif is backing the PTI’s dismantlement.

IMRAN KHAN WAS THE ARMY’S PREFERRED CANDIDATE

An irony of Khan’s fall, not lost on Pakistanis, is that he was once promoted by the army as a means to suppress other civilian parties, including Sharif’s. After he became prime minister in 2018 some observers described his government as a civil-military “hybrid”. But the generals eventually tired of his grandstanding and narcissism, leading to his ouster last year in a no-confidence vote. The attacks unleashed on army buildings by his supporters on May 9th, including the ransacking of a house belonging to the commanding general in Lahore, were unprecedented and, it is now clear, intolerable to the generals. An army spokesman promised a crackdown on all “planners, instigators, abettors and perpetrators” of the violence.

Penitent PTI leaders have since been paraded before journalists, condemning the violence, dissociating themselves from Khan, and pledging fealty to the army. Many of them have renounced politics altogether. Rights organizations accuse the government of using the crackdown to detain peaceful opponents alongside alleged rioters. The Economist added that the generals would now be weighing their options. Based on their past campaigns against civilian politicians who dared to disappoint them, these will include jailing Khan, nudging him into exile, disqualifying him from politics, and, though it seems unlikely, allowing him to contest the election at the head of whatever remains of his party. Or they might decide that the election would not be held—there are rumors that they mean to form a technocratic government instead. The latest on Imran Khan is his conviction for 14 years on the charge of illegally selling state gifts. He has already been convicted of 10 years and barred from contesting the forthcoming polls. The 14-year jail sentence is harsher than the 10-year sentence and his disqualification from contesting the forthcoming polls.  The harshness of the sentences demonstrates the complete hold of the army establishment in Pakistan.

FALL OF IMRAN KHAN AS HE CHALLENGED THE ARMY ESTABLISHMENT

Imran Khan, for his part, remains defiant. Challenging the government to “break as many people as you want”, he has called for early elections. In any event, political and economic stability is likely to remain elusive.  Khan’s sidelining will not make him less popular.  Sharif and, for that matter, whoever the generals pick to lead the country next will have to contend with vast numbers of disaffected PTI supporters. These “might be” scenarios have become futile if Imran Khan has to serve out his fourteen years of imprisonment. Pakistan’s history has been what it has been since birth and particularly after the rise of Bangabandhu as the sole leader of Bengalis in then-East Pakistan.  we should let Pakistan struggle with its problems. 

 

China’s inner demons

Assessing the loose strings in Xi-Jinping’s China as they emerge as a world power

https://www.dhakatribune.com/338990

Kazi Anwarul Masud

Publish : 09 Feb 2024, 02:21 AMUpdate : 09 Feb 2024, 10:04 AM

Advertisement: 3:40

In the Southern part of the world, an emergent China is staking its claim to replace the suzerainty of the US and be the leader. Xi-Jinping's China appears to be different from the one that Mao Tse Tung had once dreamt of and later changed his mind due to the Korean War.

 

Conflicts with Taiwan

In March 2023, Cambridge University Press published “Mao Zedong and the Taiwan Strait Crises” which encapsulated the events of 2020: The world witnessed rising tensions in the Taiwan strait as China launched “gray-zone” warfare and sent warplanes across the median line. The US followed suit by dispatching Navy warships to pass through the Taiwan Strait. The media was flooded with concerns about another Taiwan Strait crisis. People wondered if the Xi Jinping administration would invade Taiwan, as well as how the US would respond as events unfolded.

Since his inauguration as President of the People’s Republic of China in 2013, Xi Jinping has incorporated many of Mao Zedong’s strategies into his own, often promoting himself as a great figure. For example, Xi created a “Little Red Book,” and made pilgrimages to Yan’an. The current circumstances have reminded us much of the Taiwan Strait crises of 1954-1955 and 1958, in which Mao played a dominant role. However, looking back at both cases, Mao never intended to invade Taiwan (Formosa) nor fight against the US, and both crises ended through diplomatic compromise instead of war.

In March 1949, Mao Tse Tung ordered his generals to add Taiwan to the list of strategic objectives to be captured. Previously, the strategy for 1949 had been to seek the “liberation” of nine provinces in China. After the dramatic series of battlefield victories, the list of provinces to seize by the end of the year was expanded to seventeen, including Taiwan. It would be good to remind leaders in Beijing of this fact and encourage them to look for peaceful solutions along those lines. Their current policies can only lead to conflict.

 

Push for anti-corruption

 In January 2024 Xi- Jinping delivered an important speech to the Chinese Communist Party for resolutely winning the tough and protracted battle against corruption. He emphasized that in the new journey of anti-corruption, the CCP must continue to make efforts and advance, in depth, in eradicating the soil and conditions that cause corruption problems. 

The general requirement would be to persist in promoting the policy of not being afraid of corruption, not being able to be corrupt, and not wanting to be corrupt; deepening the treatment of both symptoms and root causes, precise systematic treatment; constantly expanding the depth and breadth of the anti-corruption struggle, and taking multiple measures simultaneously to eliminate old recurring problems. And then gradually reduce it to make it difficult for new problems to spread, promote the normalization and long-term prevention and treatment of corruption-related issues.

Xi Jinping pointed out that it would be necessary to strengthen the party's centralized and unified leadership in the fight against corruption. CCP committees at all levels must effectively strengthen leadership over the entire process of the anti-corruption struggle, resolutely support the investigation and handling of corruption cases, and work hard to rectify problems.

 

Examples to follow

From reports by newspapers like The Guardian, it appears that Xi-Jinping’s crusade against corruption is bearing fruit. But then the roots of corruption are so deep it is difficult to forecast what the ultimate results will be. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, for example. has reported that many seeking precedents for what might happen in China look to the Arab Spring movements or failed states elsewhere.

But more appropriate are the experiences of the very few, highly successful developing economies that formerly had autocratic political systems, such as South Korea and Taiwan. It’s worth noting that in both Taiwan and South Korea, political liberalization began around the same time in the late 1980s, and purchasing power adjusted per capita income level of around $13-15,000 and the same level of urbanization (70%), which triggered a sharp rise in the share of high-value services in the economy.

It is no coincidence that the emergence of a more knowledge-based economy generated the pressures for political liberalization. In these countries, the rise of a large and more sophisticated urban middle class made it more difficult for the state to handle social protests. Moreover, globally connected services and IT-related activities made it increasingly difficult to control the flow of information because it was not only part of the clamour for free expression but also a necessity for economic progress.

The process in China will not follow the norms of Western-type democratic movements and its system is not the same as that of its East Asian neighbours. Thus the transition process in China will be driven by internal Party structures and will have its unique China-specific characteristics. 

 

Kazi Anwarul Masud has been in diplomatic service for more than three decades. He was an ambassador to several countries, and specializes in foreign affairs with particular reference to South and South East Asia. His interests include AUKUS and the Indo-Pacific Region.

 

Is it conceivable for Russia to use nuclear weapons?

Such a move would not only end mankind as we know it, but would also mean the end of Russia itself

https://www.dhakatribune.com/336201

Photo: UNSPLASH

Kazi Anwarul Masud

Publish : 08 Jan 2024, 03:06 PMUpdate : 08 Jan 2024, 03:06 PM

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One would like to answer in the negative given the fact that such a move would not only end mankind as we know it, but would also mean the end of Russia itself. There is no reason to believe that the world, regardless of the number of nuclear weapons they possess, would let a madman survive. Yet Vladimir Putin’s remarks, are often misrepresented by learned people whose writings are printed in respected magazines like Foreign Affairs and other publications as well, perhaps on the ground that freedom of expression is guaranteed by democracies throughout the world. I found it interesting to read an article by Peter Schroeder (The Real Russian Nuclear Threat. The West Is Worried About the Wrong Escalation Risks in the December 20, 2023 issue.)

US policy on Russian use of nuclear weapons

The writer quoted at length US President Joe Biden in the following words: “I worry about Putin using tactical nuclear weapons,” US President Joe Biden said in June. The risk, he continued, is “real.” However, officials do not appear to believe that the war in Ukraine could lead Russia to use its nuclear arsenal against a NATO state, however furious it is at the West for supporting Ukraine. That is a mistake. US officials have it backward. It is quite unlikely that Russian President Vladimir Putin will use a nuclear weapon on the battlefield in Ukraine, but he may move toward using one against NATO. Unlike the West, Putin may not fear a nuclear standoff: he is well versed in Russia’s nuclear arsenal and the tenets of nuclear deterrence, and possibly sees himself as uniquely suited to navigating a nuclear crisis.

Russian president on use of nuclear weapons

Vladimir Putin has been remarkably consistent that Russia is willing to use nuclear weapons against NATO to defend its interests in Ukraine. Peter Schroeder added that even eight years ago, in a television interview done a year after Russia invaded Crimea, Russian President Vladimir Putin declared that he had been ready to place Russian nuclear forces on alert to prevent Western forces from interfering in Moscow’s takeover of the peninsula. Russian nuclear weapons use is not imminent. But if Putin does escalate the war, for instance by attacking NATO with conventional weapons, he will likely move very swiftly, so as not to give the United States a chance to maneuver away from a crisis. Washington will struggle to deter a Kremlin so emboldened.

Invasion of Ukraine and Russian nuclear policy

Ukraine is too central to the Kremlin’s ambitions—and too secondary to the United States—for Putin to believe any American threats. Ultimately, Vladimir Putin will expect the United States to back down before fighting a nuclear conflict over land so far from home. Do people believe that such an eventuality can happen in a world that has become so complex and so interdependent with phrases like “de-risking” and “de-globalization” and many other phrases being taught in schools from primary levels.

Russian suspension of New Start treaty

In his long article Peter Schroeder wrote that in February 2023, Russia suspended participation in the New START treaty, which regulated how many nuclear weapons Moscow and Washington could have. In March, the Kremlin announced that it would move some of its nuclear weapons into Belarus. In October of that year, Vladimir Putin suggested that Russia might restart nuclear testing. All the while, Russian government officials have threatened to launch a nuclear attack, as former President Dmitriy Medvedev did in July when he said Russia could “use nuclear weapons” to conclude the Ukraine war in a few days. US officials, of course, have paid attention to these threats, but they have not been convinced by them. They imagined that Moscow may use small so-called tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield, but not large so-called strategic ones against NATO states.

The US is hopeful that Russia will not use nuclear weapons

According to National Security Advisor, Jake Sullivan US experts in recent days thought that there was little fear that Russia would use strategic nuclear weapons in Ukraine or against the West, but some remained concerned that Russia could use tactical weapons. Putin, their thinking went might use these weapons to help Russian forces halt a Ukrainian attack that appeared on the verge of taking back Crimea or inflicting a significant defeat that threatened to push Russian forces out of eastern Ukraine. However, the growing complacency among US officials is based on a misunderstanding of Putin’s rhetoric and the dynamics that keep Moscow from using nuclear weapons. When Putin invokes his arsenal, he is not trying to warn that Russia could use tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine. Rather, his rhetoric is designed to threaten NATO itself. It is a blinking red light, a warning to American decision-makers that Moscow is willing to create a nuclear confrontation with Washington if needed to win in Ukraine. So long as Putin remains optimistic about Russia’s odds, he is unlikely to rock the boat in Ukraine. Tactical nuclear weapons would do little to help Russia break the stalemate. Ukrainian forces are well entrenched along a frontline that extends for roughly 600 miles, and so even dozens of tactical weapons would not be enough to let Russia push through. Even if they were, Russia does not have the maneuverable reserve forces needed to exploit any opening created by these weapons.

Chatham House weighs in on Russian nuclear policy

Peter Schroeder’s thesis was countered by Valeria Akimenko, Senior Research Analyst, Conflict Studies Research Centre of Chatham House explaining the myth of the use of Russian nuclear weapons and wrote that the circumstances under which Russia might use nuclear weapons have been the subject of lengthy and heated debate. This is in part because of mixed messages from Russia itself. Published nuclear doctrine describes a very limited set of circumstances predicting a nuclear response by Russia. But this is at odds with consistent public rhetoric from President Vladimir Putin down through the entire information apparatus of the Russian state, which has frequently made both implicit and explicit Russia’s nuclear rhetoric being incessant and emphasized readiness to use these weapons. But it aims to extract the maximum possible practical value from their mere possession, with or without actual intent to use. The impact of these threats builds on an intensive and highly effective program by Russia’s extended network of influencers abroad promising almost inevitable escalation to nuclear war if Russia’s plans are opposed. While the constant Russian nuclear refrain suggests a greater willingness to consider nuclear use in real life, in turn, based on Russia’s demonstrated greater willingness to inflict mass destruction and mass casualties in pursuit of its aims, the rationale behind these threats is to increase Russia’s operational latitude without actually having to go to war, by undermining Western will to resist. This campaign has been effective in creating an impression that Russia has an exceptionally low threshold for nuclear use and that a wide range of circumstances or “provocations” could cause that threshold to be crossed.

Russian military doctrine provides first use of nuclear weapons in conventional war

Russian nuclear doctrine provides for nuclear first use in a conventional war when the country’s “very existence” is at risk. But this has not prevented a wide range of risks in any war, even one started by Russia, being described as existential. It is argued that there need not even be a war. International sanctions and even “aggressive” statements by Russia’s “enemies” have repeatedly proved sufficient to trigger renewed nuclear threats. Western political leaders have themselves confirmed that Russia has succeeded in shaping their behavior through nuclear intimidation. A wide range of experienced analysts outside Russia hold the opinion that Russia’s nuclear weapons would only actually be used in extremis. This view holds that Russia’s nuclear arms are a political, defensive deterrent, and thus unlikely to be employed. It further suggests that advances in Russia’s conventional capabilities have made it less likely to need to resort to the use of nuclear weapons. The debate is further complicated by the layering of Russia’s nuclear capabilities, from non-strategic to strategic weapons. The contributions of Russian commentators on the nuclear policy should be treated with skepticism, but in many cases, they too have played down the likelihood of nuclear use. The arms control specialist Nikolai Sokov holds that Russia’s nuclear doctrine is defensive and that it reserves nuclear use “exclusively for situations when Russia is attacked,” albeit in a broader range of circumstances than the widely recognized criterion of an attack “which threatens the existence of the state itself.”

Photo: UNSPLASH

Limited nuclear war is “alien” to Russian strategy

Meanwhile, the former Russian military intelligence officer and Carnegie Moscow analyst Dmitri Trenin has argued that the notion of a limited nuclear war has always been “alien” to Russian strategy. Informed analysts outside Russia have also noted a trend for the threshold for Russian nuclear use to become higher, not lower, as Moscow’s conventional military capabilities have improved from their nadir in the 2000s. Kristin Ven Bruusgaard observed that “Russia today is less, not more likely to use nuclear weapons than it was 10 or 15 years ago.” Olga Oliker has also argued there is little evidence Russia has lowered its threshold for nuclear use.   Disagreements over the precise threshold for Russia to use nuclear weapons risk obscuring the key point that that threshold is far lower than for Western nuclear powers. The moral dimension of nuclear use is also far less of a constraint for Russia than for democracies, as is also the case with other actions in Russia’s conduct of war that cause revulsion abroad – most recently highlighted in Ukraine. Russia also continues to upgrade its nuclear command and control systems, regarded as a vital second-strike and warfighting capability. Moreover, while Russia’s nuclear doctrine posits its nuclear weapons as ‘exclusively’ a deterrent, it also sets out specific criteria for their employment. Each of these criteria allows for nuclear first use in circumstances that no Western leader “would even consider.”

Russia shifts to policy of  first use nuclear weapons

Russia’s shifting first-use posture in the late 1990s and into the 2000s -- a pivot from “no first use” to “first use if necessary” to “assured first use if Russia’s survival is at stake” -- demonstrates its reliance on a nuclear arsenal for both deterrent and warfighting purposes. The risks of miscalculation, meanwhile, have been strongly emphasized by Russia in its campaign of intimidation but do nevertheless exist. However, while all of these factors demonstrate that Russia’s attitude to nuclear use is significantly different from that of a NATO nuclear power, this attitude does not set preconditions for reckless, pointless or suicidal nuclear attacks in response to marginal threats. While Russia’s attitude to nuclear use is significantly different from that of a NATO nuclear power, this attitude does not set preconditions for reckless, pointless or suicidal nuclear attacks in response to marginal threats. As noted above, the most direct and obvious success of Russia’s nuclear threats is in constraining Western support for Ukraine. But Russia capitalizes far more broadly on the perception that it must not be impeded, offended or, most of all, defeated. This means there are few credible options for responding in the event of Russian use of non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs), which in turn enhances their intimidatory power. In other words, the threat of massive US retaliation alone is inadequate if Western nuclear deterrence is to remain credible.

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Chatham House advises restraint to the West in dealing with Russian nuclear threats

Valeryia Akimenko concludes by saying that good policy means responding soberly to Russian nuclear threats, while at the same time ensuring that any actual nuclear use cannot go unanswered. Russia has weaponized nuclear rhetoric to great effect, evident in the near-panic that ensues every time President Putin mentions the possibility of nuclear use. The international community should recognize that this is a routine element of Russian state communications and should take a long view in assessing such propaganda rather than reacting to each new occasion when it is employed. Consistent long-term policy is called for instead. To close the deterrence gap, NATO must re-examine and re-emphasize its nuclear deterrent in such a way as to address the threat, however remote, of low-yield nuclear weapons being employed for limited military objectives and localized effect. It must better calibrate its capabilities to the developments in Russia’s arsenal, and address the gaps in NATO’s escalatory ladder that have formed as a result. Conventional and nuclear, defensive and offensive, symmetrical and asymmetrical military countermeasures must be demonstratively available for use for maximum effect in deterring any consideration of nuclear use by Russia. The gulf in non-strategic nuclear capability demands policy adjustment, beyond the step already taken to fit several low-yield warheads to strategic submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Cheaper and more credible delivery platforms, distinguishable from those designed for a strategic nuclear strike, are essential. This is not to argue for a full-on nuclear arms race. Rather, it is essential to signal resolve, which is often lacking, as well as to demonstrate potential, which at the moment is also absent. Defensive action against the use of NSNWs, such as the hardening of high-value targets, must be considered. A coordinated division of labor is necessary both within NATO and more broadly. NATO’s non-nuclear member states and other like-minded non-nuclear nations must also contribute towards advanced conventional deterrent capabilities, including missile defense and a full range of stand-off fires. The Kremlin should not retain its monopoly on public discussion of nuclear use, and nuclear threats must be responded to rather than with panic. Russia should be challenged directly over its own toxic and irresponsible domestic and international nuclear statements. Above all, situations that would warrant a limited nuclear response by Western nuclear powers, such as Russian use of NSNWs or other weapons of mass destruction, should be discussed publicly to reduce Russia’s confidence in Western self-deterrence. All of these measures would render Russia’s nuclear threats even less realistic, and hence a less effective tool for intimidation. (Publication date: August 23, 2022).

Given the above information on Russian nuclear weapons and her policy on the use of nuclear weapons we the people of the world would like to be hopeful for the continued prosperity of mankind. The rise of China, albeit a wrinkle in global politics, is expected to contribute to the development of mankind. One hopes that the “limitless friendship” between Russia and China will not be able to stand in the way of the progress of democratic people regardless of the opposition by the Sino-Russian entente. Many developing countries would indeed be attracted by China’s Bridges and Road (BRI) initiative aimed at developing the infrastructures of these countries that have the need but not the resources. China’s BRI initiative is attractive to developing countries because China does not impose any restrictions on the loans given to these countries. But BRI projects have been publicly criticized by the Americans in particular dubbing the initiative as Debt Trap. Such accusations, however, do not touch Russia or its policy on nuclear weapons. 

Kazi Anwarul Masud has been in diplomatic service for more than three decades. He was an ambassador to several countries, and specializes in foreign affairs with particular reference to South and South East Asia. His interests include AUKUS and the Indo-Pacific Region.  

https://www.dhakatribune.com/336201