Friday, November 24, 2023

 The Arab-Islamic Summit in Riyadh brought together leaders from Arab and Asian nations, who called for an immediate end to the war on Gaza. (SPA)

Summit Of Muslim World In Riyadh – OpEd

By 

The world appears to be on the verge of disquiet and even famous analysts are confused as to which direction the global unease will take shape. At the Extraordinary Summit of the Muslim World held in Riyadh on 12 November 2023, Bangladesh’s Prime Minister put forward a five-point proposal to ease the Israeli aggression in Gaza.

Describing Gaza as the most densely populated open-air prison in the world for decades, she said that the once-persecuted Jewish people are now pitilessly destroying the homes, hopes, and families of hapless Palestinians who gave them shelter during their difficult days. Expressing Bangladesh’s support for the Palestinians she expressed Palestinians right to self-determination, sovereignty, and independence based on the 1967 border and the Two-State Solution with Al-Quds Al-Sharif as its capital.

On November 12, 2023 the Organization of Islamic Conference in a strongly worded statement (OIC) strongly condemned the ongoing Israeli military aggression against the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip for the sixth day in a row, killing more than 1,200 martyrs, wounding thousands of civilians, including women and children, and destructing residential buildings, civilian facilities, infrastructure, hospitals, schools, places of worship, and United Nations facilities. Add to this the inhumane water and power outages and continued daily deliberate killings in West Bank cities in conjunction with the repeated attacks on the blessed Al-Aqsa Mosque.

The OIC considered this brutal aggression against the Palestinian people a blatant international and humanitarian law violation and a war crime. The OIC held Israel, the occupying power, fully responsible for the repercussions of the continuation of this sinful aggression, calling, at the same time, for the international community to intervene urgently to force Israel, the occupying power, to stop its ongoing attacks against the Palestinian people immediately, and to ensure the opening of humanitarian corridors to facilitate the entry of medicines and food supplies and basic needs to the Gaza Strip.

Influential British magazine The Economist in a write-up titled Is a two-state solution possible after the Gaza war?, added that when Israel left Gaza in 2005, uprooting some 8,000 Jewish settlers from a territory it had controlled since 1967, no one knew quite what to make of the decision. Some hoped that Israel’s willingness to cede occupied territory would be a trend, a step towards a final settlement with the Palestinians. Others saw a canny ploy: relinquishing control of Gaza might help Israel entrench its control of the West Bank. The latter view turned out to be correct.

Similar confusion has emerged since October 7th, when Israel began planning a ground invasion of Gaza after Hamas, the militant Islamist group that controls the territory, massacred 1,400 Israelis. Palestinians fear the war will lead to a second Naqba (“catastrophe”), referring to the mass displacement that accompanied Israel’s birth in 1948. Far-right Israeli ministers hope it will offer a chance to reassert control over Gaza and rebuild the dismantled Jewish settlements. 

A few hopeful sorts, among them President Joe Biden hoped it would provide a chance to revive the comatose Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Many Middle Eastern experts have opined that amid Israel’s ongoing airstrikes and ground offensive in Gaza, Arab states with peace and normalization treaties with Israel have found themselves in a delicate position. 

Following Hamas’ attack on Oct. 7, initial regional calls for de-escalation quickly turned into denunciations of Israel’s bombing campaign, after leaders in Jordan, Egypt, and Israel’s Gulf state partners—namely Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates—have faced pressure from their fiercely pro-Palestinian populations to address Gaza’s plight. With criticism of Israel escalating, Jordan recalled its ambassador and a rumor spread that Bahrain had severed its ties with Israel. Crucially however, Israel’s Arab partners—as well as Saudi Arabia, with which Israel had been in talks toward normalizing relations prior to the war—have also prioritized ties with the U.S., as Washington has doubled down on its regional security commitments since Oct. 7, deploying naval ships to the Eastern Mediterranean and pledging a $14.5 billion aid package to Israel. 

Against this backdrop, Arab states have gravitated to the U.S. for security assurances amid fears of regional flare-ups and tensions with Iranian allies across the region. Indeed, Saudi Arabian Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman traveled to the White House in early November, seeking enhanced U.S. security guarantees in the event of extra tensions.

Friday, November 17, 2023

 

india-china.jpg

Image source: EuroAsia Review - Photo: 2023

India-led South Asia Plays a Significant Role in Global Politics

By Ambassador Kazi Anwarul Masud

The writer is a former Secretary and ambassador of Bangladesh

DHAKA. 1 October 2023 (IDN) — South Asia is the southern subregion of Asia, defined in geographical and ethnic-cultural terms. As commonly conceptualized, South Asia consists of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.

Most recent figures in US$ for the per capita income of South Asian countries with the year of enumeration are as follows: By the latest count, the countries possessing nuclear weapons are as follows: Russia—6,257 (1,458 active, 3039 available,), United States—5,550 (1,389 active, 2,361 available,) China—350 available (actively expanding nuclear arsenal), France—290 available, United Kingdom—225 available, Pakistan—165 available, India—156 available, Israel—90 available, and North Korea—40-50 available (estimated). 

In an article (24 September 2023) Kruthika Pathi of AP writes, “The United States, Britain and India’s Cold War-era ally Russia have voiced support for India’s permanent membership over the years. But U.N. bureaucracy has stopped the council from expanding. And even if that changes, China—India’s neighbor and regional rival—would likely block a request. Kept out of the UN’s most important body, Modi has made sure that his country is smack at the center of a tangled web of global politics. On one hand, New Delhi is part of the Quad and the G20, seen as mostly Western groups. On the other, it wants to expand its influence in the BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, where Russia and China dominate.

The deft juggling of the West and the rest has come to define India’s multipolar foreign policy. Its diplomatic sway has only grown over its reluctance to condemn Russia for its war in Ukraine, a stance that resonated among many developing countries that have also been neutral. And the West, which sees an ascendant India as crucial to countering China, has stepped up ties with Narendra Modi. By doing so, it looks past concerns of democratic backsliding under his government.

Before Narendra Modi India had a glorious past. When the British left in 1947 with independence, India was blessed with several leaders of world stature, most notably Mahatma Gandhi and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, who were able to galvanize the masses at home and bring prestige to India abroad. The country has played an increasing role in global affairs.

Contemporary India’s increasing physical prosperity and cultural dynamism—despite continued domestic challenges and economic inequality—are seen in its well-developed infrastructure and a highly diversified industrial base, in its pool of scientific and engineering personnel (one of the largest in the world), in the pace of its agricultural expansion, and in its rich and vibrant cultural exports of music, literature, and cinema.

Though the country’s population remains largely rural, India has three of the most populous and cosmopolitan cities in the world MumbaiKolkata, and Delhi. Three other Indian cities—Bangalore, Madras, and Hyderabad—are among the world’s fastest-growing high-technology centers, and most of the world’s major information formation technology and software companies now have offices in India.  

According to last (updated on 27 September 2023) figures, India has emerged as the fastest-growing major economy in the world and is expected to be one of the top three economic powers in the world over the next 10-15 years, backed by its robust democracy and strong partnerships. India’s appeal as a destination for investments has grown stronger and more sustainable as a result of the current period of global unpredictability and volatility, and the record amounts of money raised by India-focused funds in 2022 are evidence of investor faith in the “Invest in India” narrative.

India’s nominal gross domestic product (GDP) at current prices is estimated to be at US$ 3.31 trillion (Rs. 272.41 trillion) in FY22. Additionally, the Nominal GDP at current prices in Q3 of 2022-23 was US$ 874.84 billion (Rs. 71.82 trillion), as against US$ 792.3 billion (Rs. 65.05 trillion) in 2021-22, estimating a growth of 10.4%. With 115 unicorns valued at more than US$ 350 billion, as of February 2023, India presently has the third-largest unicorn base in the world. The government is also focusing on renewable sources by achieving 40% of its energy from non-fossil sources by 2030. 

However, India’s growth rate has been stilled by the arrest of India’s growth imposed by China. China and India are the two emerging economies in the world. As of 2021, China and India are the 2nd and 5th largest economies in the world, respectively, on a nominal basis. On a PPP basis, China is at 1st, and India is at 3rd place. Both countries share 21% and 26% of the total global wealth in nominal and PPP terms, respectively. Among Asian countries, China and India together contribute more than half of Asia’s GDP. In 1987, both countries’ GDP (Nominal) was almost equal; even in PPP terms, China was slightly ahead of India in 1990. Now, in 2021, GDP is 5.46 times higher than India’s. On a PPP basis, the GDP of China is 2.61x that of India. China crossed the $1 trillion mark in 1998, while India crossed nine years later in 2007 on an exchange rate basis.

Both countries have been neck-to-neck in GDP terms till 1990. As per both methods, India was richer than China in 1990. In 2021, China is almost 5.4 times richer than India on the nominal and 2.58 times richer in the PPP method. The per capita rank of China and India is 63rd and 147th, respectively, in nominal. The per capita rank of China and India is 76th and 130th, resp, in pp. China attained a maximum GDP growth rate of 19.30% in 1970 and a minimum of -27.27% in 1961. India reached an all-time high of 9.63% in 1988 and a record low of -5.24% in 1979. From 1961 to 2019, China grew by more than 10% in 22 years while India failed. The GDP growth rate was negative in five and four years for China and India, respectively. 

Concern about conflict in the Taiwan Strait

Michael Kugleman who writes for Foreign Policy magazine in one of his recent writings, explained that Still, South Asian states are likely more concerned about conflict in the Taiwan Strait because it would disrupt trade with China, not because it would interrupt efforts at friendship between Taiwan and the region. However, India has expanded economic cooperation with Taiwan more than any of its neighbors, in great part because of its sharp rivalry with China. Trade with India accounts for nearly 80 percent of Taiwan’s trade with South Asia. In recent decades, New Delhi and Taipei have inked a bilateral investment agreement and pursued science and technology cooperation Despite India’s vows to curtail commercial cooperation with China, it remains a top trade partner. New Delhi has also never opposed Beijing’s “One China” principle—its view that it has sovereignty over the mainland, Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan.

Furthermore, its guiding foreign-policy principle—strategic autonomy—forbids it from taking formal positions on other countries’ disputes. If China were to invade Taiwan, India would likely take a muted position—one comparable to its stand on Russia’s war in Ukraine. India already carefully manages its diplomatic relations with a few rivals—the United States and Russia, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, to name a couple—and escalating tensions between China and Taiwan present another case. So far, India has succeeded at this balancing act by staying quiet. Sana Hashmi, an expert on India-Taiwan relations based in Taipei, told me this week that if New Delhi made any public statement, it would mostly likely cover the “bare minimum,” and probably not mention China or Taiwan by name. If it did, this would “mean a policy change,” she said. Y

et the broader geopolitics matter for India. China-Taiwan tensions are playing out in the Indo-Pacific region, where India strongly supports U.S. policy that revolves around countering China. Even major Chinese military provocations falling short of an invasion would be a major blow to the policy, which aims to keep the region peaceful. Current tensions are “destabilizing the Indo-Pacific, and that does impact India’s security interests and its objectives in the Indo-Pacific,” according to an analyst.    

Unwilling to get involved in US-China competition

 Seeking to avoid getting pulled into U.S.-China competition, other South Asian states have distanced themselves from the Indo-Pacific policy—even though many of them have received investments as part of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative. Bangladesh declined a U.S. invitation to become a partner in the policy, while Nepal long resisted agreeing to an infrastructure grant that U.S. officials had described as part of the policy. The destabilizing effects of tensions in the Taiwan Strait could still present a problem for South Asia more broadly—by threatening some of its partners. The reason for the refusal by South Asian countries of the US proposal is mainly due to their need for the construction of infrastructure for which these countries did not have the funds that the Chinese were willing to provide under their Road and Belt Initiative despite former Vice President Mike Pence’s warning of “Chinese Debt Trap”. It is well known that China and India are the two most populous countries in the world. China was the most populous country with approximately 1.42 billion people in 2018. India was the second largest country by population with approximately 1.35 billion inhabitants in 2018. China and India together account for 36.28% of the total world population of 7,632,819,325. Various macroeconomic growth indicators of the two countries have been compiled to understand what led to the rapid growth of China vs. India. India’s GDP growth rate in the last 17 years has averaged 6.61% CAGR while China’s GDP growth rate has averaged 9.28% Compound Annual Growth Rate(CAGR). China’s capital investment as a percentage of GDP which is a proxy for Investment as a percentage of GDP has averaged 43% while India’s investment as a percentage of GDP has averaged 34.2% in the last 17 years. Subdued investment as a percentage of GDP has led to lower India’s GDP growth rate while China has maintained its investment rate. Indian economy growth rate will rise when capital investment rises for which India will need bigger government and private spending.

It is projected that by 2024, India will have more people than China with approximately 1.44 billion people. Currently, China’s population growth rate is 0.39%, while India is growing at 1.11%.  In 1950, the population of China was 554 million. While the population of India was 376 million. China crossed the one billion mark in 1981 and India in 1998. By 2029, India will cross the 1.5 billion mark. The population density of India is 455 people per square km compared to 148 of China. So, India is 2.96 times denser than China. China is 4th and India is the 7th largest country in terms of area. China’s GDP per capita in constant 2010 dollars grew from $1,767 in 2000 to $7,308 in 2017 translating to a 8.71% Compound Annual Growth Rate CAGR while India grew its per capita GDP from $826 in 2000 to $1987 in 2017 at 5.31% CAGR. Slower per capita growth in India is partially because of a lower female labor force participation rate of ~23% while China has reported closer to ~60% female labor participation rate. China’s GDP growth was export-led while India is still trying to generate a trade surplus. China’s export as a percentage of GDP in 2006 peaked at 36% then it has gradually fallen and in 2018, China’s export as a percentage of GDP was 19.7%. China has increased its share of high technology exports as a percentage of total manufacturing exports averaging 21% while India delivered 6.4% in the last 25 years. High technology exports make China competitive and it becomes a supplier that is difficult to replace vs. other nations whose exports are commodity in nature. Apart from economic differences China and India have hundreds of kilometers of demarcated border where border clashes have occurred.

According to Wikipedia the border between China and India is disputed at multiple locations. There is “no publicly available map depicting the Indian version of the LAC,” and the Survey of India maps are the only evidence of the official border for India. The Chinese version of the LAC mostly consists of claims in the Ladakh region, but China also claims Arunachal Pradesh in northeast India. China and India previously fought over the border in 1962 and 1967 with China gaining victory in the former and India gaining victory in the latter. Since the 1980s, there have been over 50 rounds of talks between the two countries related to these border issues.  During Xi Jinping‘s visit to New Delhi in September 2014, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi discussed the boundary question and urged his counterpart for a solution. Since Modi became Prime Minister in 2014 until the 2020 standoff, Modi and Xi met 18 times, including those on the sidelines of summits and five visits to China.  According to an analyst  “… improving combat readiness is now a strategic mission for the Chinese military …. China has since increased its military presence in the Tibetan Plateau.  China has also been increasing its footprint with India’s neighbors – Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan to, prevent  India from having a monopoly in the region, China is now posing a direct challenge to New Delhi’s influence in South Asia.   The disputed territory of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir is administered by PakistanIndia, and China. Multiple reasons have been cited as the trigger for these skirmishes., Critics have blamed successive Indian governments (including the current Narendra Modi government) of neglecting the border areas for decades and turning a “blind eye” to Chinese land grabbing in the region. 

According to them, India had failed in the protection of its borders, and even in 2020, all along the LAC, India had lost land.  In mid-June 2020, a BJP member of Parliament from Arunachal Pradesh acknowledged the presence of regular Chinese patrols inside north-east India as well. MIT professor, Taylor Fravel, said that the skirmishes were a response from China to the development of Indian infrastructure in Ladakh.  He added that it was a show of strength for China amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, which had damaged the Chinese economy and its international reputation.  According to Yun Sun, a China specialist at the Stimson Center, China perceived India’s road-building as a threat to its “territorial integrity” which it will not sacrifice for the sake of good relations with India. Wang Shida of China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations linked the current border tensions to India’s decision to abrogate Article 370 and change the status of Jammu and Kashmir in 2019. Some postulated that a parliamentary speech by Amit Shah, the Minister of Home Affairs, also could have irked China. In the speech, Shah had declared that Aksai Chin, a disputed region administered by China, was part of the Indian-administered Ladakh Union Territory. An Indian diplomat also agreed that New Delhi’s moves related to Jammu and Kashmir irked Beijing.  Other analysts linked the skirmishes to India’s growing alliance with the United States. Tanvi Madan, author of Fateful Triangle (a book about the international relations between the US, India, and China) stated that India thought that this was a “signal from Beijing” to “limit” its relations with the US. 

A former diplomat of India stated that “smaller powers like India and Australia, who have aligned with the US, are witnessing a more aggressive China”. India’s former ambassador to China said that these skirmishes were part of a growing Chinese assertiveness in both the Indo-China border and the South China sea.  Raja Mohan, Director of the Institute of South Asian Studies at the National University of Singapore, writes that the growing power imbalance between China and India is the main cause of the dispute, with everything else such as the location of the dispute or international ties of India, being mere detail. In short since Indo-China-Pakistan conflicts are not going away driving India despite its non-alignment policy in the ultimate analysis India would have to align herself with the US for her survival and to hold on to her preeminence in South Asia and deny China its design to grab South Asia as its base like the one in Sri Lanka. [IDN-InDepthNews]

 

Western Leaders Sing the Same Tune for Israel

Context is everything. The regional picture is also more complicated. In 2002 the Arab League endorsed a Saudi proposal that promised Israel normal relations with Arab countries after a two-state solution: by ending its conflict with the Palestinians, Israel could end all its regional conflicts.

  
6 mins read
 
Members of the U.S. military carry the Israeli and U.S. flags before the arrival of Israeli Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman during an honor cordon at the U.S. Defense Department in Washington, on April 26, 2018. [ Photo: BRENDAN SMIALOWSKI/AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES ]

In trying to plan for the future, world leaders are looking to the past. “When this crisis is over, there has to be a vision of what comes next, and in our view, it has to be a two-state solution,” said Joe Biden, America’s president, in one of his many public statements about the nearly month-long war in Gaza. Rishi Sunak, the British prime minister, has made similar comments; so has Emmanuel Macron, the French president. An emergency meeting of the Arab League last month ended with a call for “serious negotiations” towards a two-state solution. Read all our coverage of the war between Israel and Hamas When Israel left Gaza in 2005, uprooting some 8,000 Jewish settlers from a territory it had controlled since 1967, no one knew quite what to make of the decision. Some hoped that Israel’s willingness to cede occupied territory would be a trend, a step towards a final settlement with the Palestinians. Others saw a canny ploy: relinquishing control of Gaza might help Israel entrench its control of the West Bank. The latter view turned out to be correct. Similar confusion has emerged since October 7th, when Israel began planning a ground invasion of Gaza after Hamas, the militant Islamist group that controls the territory, massacred 1,400 Israelis.

ISRAEL AIMS AT THE SECOND CATASTROPHE

 Palestinians fear the war will lead to a second Naqba (“catastrophe”), referring to the mass displacement that accompanied Israel’s birth in 1948. Far-right Israeli ministers hope it will offer a chance to reassert control over Gaza and rebuild the dismantled Jewish settlements. A few hopeful sorts, among them President Joe Biden hope it will provide a chance to revive the comatose Israeli-Palestinian peace process. For now, that is a far-off dream: Israeli generals expect months of fighting. But both they and many foreign powers hope eventually to transfer control of Gaza to the Palestinian Authority (PA), which governs parts of the West Bank, probably with a peacekeeping force brought in to help the transition. And they doubt that Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian president, would return to Gaza without a guarantee of meaningful talks about Palestinian statehood.

IS PLAN FOR TWO STATE SOLUTION FEASIBLE?

 Any plan for the “day after” in Gaza, in other words, needs to consider the possibility of a two-state solution. The broad outline has not changed much for decades. A Palestinian state would be formed in Gaza and the West Bank; Israel would swap chunks of its territory for portions of the West Bank where it has built large settlements. Jerusalem would be divided, with some sort of joint control over the old city. A small number of Palestinian refugees could return to Israel, while the rest would settle in either Palestine or their present homes elsewhere. Israel would expect a Palestinian state to be demilitarized. After two decades of serious talks—from the hopeful era of the Oslo Accords in the early 1990s, through a desultory attempt under Barack Obama—the peace process ground to a halt in 2014. There have been no serious negotiations since. Negotiators cannot quite pick up where they left off. At the end of 2021, there were 465,400 Israeli settlers living in the West Bank, up from 116,300 when the Oslo Accords were signed in 1993. They are a growing obstacle to peace. Most are concentrated in areas that would probably be ceded to Israel in an agreement, but their political clout (they would oppose surrendering even land that they do not live on) has increased along with their population.

WILL SAUDI PROPOSAL TO NORMALISE RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL WILL HELP TWO TWO-STATE SOLUTION?

Context is everything. The regional picture is also more complicated. In 2002 the Arab League endorsed a Saudi proposal that promised Israel normal relations with Arab countries after a two-state solution: by ending its conflict with the Palestinians, Israel could end all its regional conflicts. The Arab Peace Initiative was meant to be a powerful inducement. Israel might be more willing to take its boot off the Palestinians if it felt that other threats would then dissipate. But the region has changed since 2002. Some militias, from Hizbullah in Lebanon to the Houthis in Yemen, are now more powerful than the states they call home. It would not suffice for Arab governments to end their conflicts with Israel: non-state actors would have to agree to do so as well. Other things could be easier. A two-state solution would be costly. Even before the war, the Palestinians would have expected help to rehabilitate Gaza; the bill will be much higher now. At the failed Camp David summit in 2000 negotiators discussed a $30bn fund to compensate Palestinian refugees for lost property. Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which have boosted ties with Israel in recent years, might be more willing to stump up the cash to show they have not abandoned the Palestinians. The biggest problem, however, remains not the details of a solution but the political will to negotiate and implement one.

BENJAMIN NETANYAHU IS THE ROADBLOCK IN ARRIVING AT A SOLUTION

There will be no serious peace process with Binyamin Netanyahu’s coalition of far-right and religious politicians. That coalition is unlikely to survive long after the Gaza war, and  Netanyahu’s opponents hope that the next government will be more amenable to talks with the Palestinians. “We learned a lesson that we need to separate from them in a good way,” says one centrist Israeli lawmaker. “It’s time to start that discussion.” But Israeli politicians from the center and left have avoided the issue in public for more than a decade. On the Palestinian side, Hamas has always been eager to play spoiler. Its first suicide bombings in the 1990s helped to scuttle the Oslo process, and the carnage it wrought during the second intifada (“uprising”) from 2000 to 2005 turned a generation of Israelis against the idea of compromise. Perhaps Hamas will fade away after the war in Gaza—but another group could take its place. Ordinary people on both sides have lost faith in the two-state solution. A poll in September 2022 by the Israel Democracy Institute, a non-partisan think-tank, found that only 32% of Israeli Jews would support one, down from 47% five years earlier. Israeli Arabs, who make up one-fifth of the population, still endorsed the idea, although their support has also dropped, from 87% in 2017 to 71% in 2022. A plurality of Israeli Jews preferred the status quo. Support has plummeted even further among Palestinians.

RECENT SURVEY DOES NOT SUPPORT TWO STATE SOLUTION

A survey in June 2023 by the Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research found that just 28% still support a two-state solution. Some 53% of them backed the idea ten years ago, though just 39% thought it feasible. Optimists hope that these results are squishy: people are unlikely to support something they think is impossible. A meaningful peace process could push the poll numbers back up. “I don’t think our people would reject a chance to end the occupation,” says one former Palestinian minister. But the events of recent weeks could just as well harden both sides against the idea of compromise. As ever in Israel, some of the strongest supporters of ending the occupation are the men tasked with running it. In the wake of the Hamas attack, few Israelis are talking publicly about the two-state solution—or any other solution for the conflict. But defense officials are discussing it in closed rooms. That is partly because the desired end state of the war will shape the war itself and because the Netanyahu government is incapable of holding a serious debate on Israel’s long-term strategy. Then there is the question of who will play mediator.

RUSSIA AND CHINA LACK CREDIBILITY IN PEACE-MAKING ROLE

Though Russia and China both aspire to a role in Middle East peacemaking, neither has much leverage or credibility to assume it. The European Union could position itself as an honest broker but it is not taken seriously. That leaves America.  Biden spent the first three years of his presidency trying to ignore the conflict. He will have other things on his mind in 2024—and neither Israelis nor Palestinians are likely to embark on a peace process with a president who could soon be turfed out.

If  Biden wins in 2024, he could try to lead efforts. Donald Trump would be another story. In January 2020, after years of trailing a supposedly serious peace plan devised by Jared Kushner, his son-in-law, he finally unveiled it. The plan, almost laughably biased in favor of Israel, was dead on arrival. It would have given the Palestinians just 75% of the occupied West Bank, in three cantons linked by highways. Israel would have kept the Jordan Valley, the breadbasket of the territory, and compensated the Palestinians for their loss by ceding a few patches of barren desert in the Negev. Palestine’s capital would have been limited to a few destitute suburbs of east Jerusalem. The Palestinians, unsurprisingly, refused even to discuss the proposal.

 stop the war genocide

Can The Word ‘Genocide’ Be Obliterated From The Global Dictionary? – OpEd

By 

Whenever I read or hear the word “ genocide” I cannot but shiver in my bones because of the unspeakable brutality the Pakistan dictator of Yahaya Khan’s regime had perpetrated on the unarmed Bengalis who had no similarity with the other part of Pakistan except religion i. e. Muslim.

The parts of Pakistan had no similarity in language, culture, or in any other respect. The result was the war of liberation of Bangladesh with the help of then-Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi who with the help of the Soviet Union, a permanent member of the United Nations, used veto power till such time Yahaya Khan was forced to direct brutal commander of Pakistani army in East Pakistan Lt. Gen. A.A.K. Niazi in 1971, to Lt Gen Jagjit Singh Aurora, PVSM, then GOC-in-C, Eastern Command, accepted history’s greatest surrender since the end of World War-II.

Even today in my eighties, I consider Mrs. Indira Gandhi as the greatest humanitarian individual that the world has ever seen. Her untiring efforts released the imprisoned Bengalis from the brutal captivity of the Pakistani military regime. Innumerable books and articles have been written on the Bangladesh Liberation War. One more article by me will not make any difference. 

The world today is in the grips of an uncertain future and even scholars of different disciplines cannot predict what will happen in a few decades. Washington Post in a write-up ( 07-11-2023) titled Israel’s war in Gaza and the specter of “genocide” quoted that in condemning Israel’s actions, governments in Brazil, South Africa, and Colombia, among others, have all explicitly invoked “genocide” to explain their outrage. Israel’s overwhelming campaign against Hamas has led to the widespread devastation of besieged Gaza, triggering a humanitarian crisis. Israeli bombardments have now killed more than 10,000 Palestinians in Gaza”.

The write-up added its critics see the most powerful military in the Middle East, buttressed by the solidarity of most Western governments, perpetrating what may be de facto ethnic cleansing. “The war is one of asymmetrical counter-genocide,” wrote Martin Shaw, a distinguished genocide scholar, in New Lines Magazine. “Hamas’ killings of Israeli civilians constituted a wave of ‘genocidal massacres,’ localized mass killings whose victims were defined by their Israeli-Jewish identity.” On the other hand, Shaw added, Israel’s bombing and invasion of Gaza have “affected the whole population of the territory, far more extensively and deeply (except in a moral and emotional sense) than the Israeli population has been affected by Hamas’ violence”.

The Israeli attitude towards Hamas can be described as one bent upon the total destruction of Hamas and of Palestine. The Washington Post report earlier described the intent of prominent Israeli officials calling for not simply for the defeat of Hamas but for the annihilation of Gaza, the starving of its population, and the removal of Palestinians from some or all of its territory. The Israeli President suggested that civilians in the Hamas-controlled territory are not “innocent.” Such rhetoric has alarmed myriad international experts, many of whom contend that Israel is already potentially guilty of war crimes in its collective punishment of the Palestinians living in Gaza and the bombing of civilian homes. 

A group of current U.N. special rapporteurs on human rights in a statement called for a cease-fire.  U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken concluded his latest whirlwind tour of Middle Eastern capitals without clinching even a humanitarian “pause” in hostilities that could allow for more aid to enter Gaza or for the release of hostages. The Biden administration finds itself enabling and supplying an Israeli war machine bent on a “mighty vengeance,” as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has put it, while also, in private dealings, trying to restrain Israel from exacting an even greater price on Palestinian civilians.

British newsmagazine The Guardian in a report from an Israeli source reportedly advocated the forcible and permanent transfer of all 2.2 million inhabitants. Cairo has been absolutely clear that this is a non-starter, not least because all foresee that Palestinians are unlikely to be able to return. Nor is there enthusiasm for another idea reportedly explored by the US and Israel, which would see regional powers take control temporarily, backed up by a multinational force, possibly including US and British troops. It is hard to see Western leaders opting to put their personnel in harm’s way. More plausible might be an Arab peacekeeping force, funded by Riyadh. The UAE has stressed that it is not pulling back from its normalization of ties with Israel, and the White House says that Saudi Arabia is still open to a deal. But politically, they could not sign up without a proper deal for Palestinians. 

All this led to the Palestinian Authority, whose prime minister, Mohammad Shtayyeh, told the Guardian that it would not run Gaza without a solution for the West Bank. If the repeated invocation of the two-state solution by Western leaders in recent days was partly intended to deflect criticism of their failure to condemn the enormous civilian toll of Israel’s offensive, it also reflects a growing sense that there is no longer a choice. Mohammed Dahlan, sometimes cited as a possible, if controversial, future leader of the Palestinians, also laid out a postwar path to a future state this week. The terrain could not, however, be less promising or more treacherous. It is clear that it cannot be crossed under the current political leadership. The building of settlements has steadily increased since the Israeli-Palestinian peace accords signed in Oslo in 1993.

Since October 7th President Joe Biden has urged Binyamin Netanyahu, the Israeli prime minister, to rein in the settlers—in vain. Extreme right-wing settlers who hold key posts in Netanyahu’s cabinet seem to have no wish to calm things down.  Netanyahu’s current government has delighted the settlers by earmarking large sums for settler roads (from which Palestinians are generally barred) and by giving an ultra-nationalist settler who is the finance minister, extra power over planning regulations in the West Bank, though the last word on this still lies with Netanyahu and his defense minister. On the ground, settlers are rarely punished for initiating the violence.

Added to the Palestine issue is that in early this year President Vladimir Putin announced Russian suspension of its participation in the New START treaty.   The New START treaty was signed in Prague in 2010. It came into force the following year and was extended in 2021 for five more years after United States President Joe Biden took office. It caps the number of strategic nuclear warheads that the United States and Russia can deploy, and the deployment of land and submarine-based missiles and bombers to deliver them. Russia has the largest stockpile of nuclear weapons in the world, with close to 6,000 warheads. 

Together, Russia and the United States hold about 90 percent of the world’s nuclear warheads – enough to destroy the planet many times over. Putin blamed Western nations for trying to ‘distract people’s attention’ with principles of democracy and freedom to defend their totalitarian values and they tried to distract people’s attention from corruption scandals … from economic-social problems. Putin put the responsibility on the West and Ukrainian elite.  He warned that the more the West sent weapons to Ukraine, the more Russia would have the responsibility of the security situation at the Russian border. 

The Western countries can be held responsible for the global insecurity mainly because of their support for Israel. It is not fully understood as the American people in particular, barring the older generation, are not particularly interested in Zionism. Regardless of Western support or otherwise of Zionism Israel has consistently gained the support of the West. As for the USA, a significant number of members of Congress are Jews who naturally support Israel and are immensely generous to open their purse for Israel.  Besides several Israeli Prime Ministers e. g. Golda Meir was an American. Benjamin Netanyahu also spent considerable time in Philadelphia where his father was a college Professor. He also has a degree from MIT.

On the Arab side both the sons of King Faisal were Princeton graduates while the mother of King Abdullah of Jordan was a British national. But due to the overwhelming support of the USA and other countries of the West a two-state solution, however attractive, would be difficult to achieve.