Saturday, July 15, 2023

China Flag Chinese Asia National Country Symbol

Could China’s Rise As A Superpower Lead To A Nuclear War? – OpEd

July 7, 2023 0 Comments

According to Dr. Prabhakar Deshpande, an Indian analyst, the origin of QUAD can be traced back to the evolution of Exercise Malabar and the 2004 Tsunami, when India conducted relief and rescue operations for itself and neighboring countries and was later joined by US, Japan, and Australia.

Obviously feeling endangered, China issued formal diplomatic protests to the members of the Quad. Followed by this, Australia withdrew in 2008 from the forum, ostensibly, due to political pressure from the Chinese government, but in 2010, Australia again joined the Quad’s naval exercises and enhanced military cooperation between the US and Australia was resumed. Japanese PM Shinzo Abe, in 2012, emphasized the idea of Asia’s ‘Democratic Security Diamond’, comprising the US, Japan, India, and Australia.

Following this, in 2017, the first official talks under the Quad took place in the Philippines. The motive behind the Quad is believed by Dr. Deshpande to keep the strategic sea routes in the Indo-Pacific, free of any military or political influence. It is basically seen as a strategic grouping, aimed at reducing the Chinese domination.

Core Objective Of The Quad

The core objective of the Quad is, to secure a rules-based global order, freedom of navigation, and, a liberal trading system. The coalition also aims to offer, alternative debt financing for nations in the Indo-Pacific region. It is believed, that the forum strategically counters China’s economic and military rise. As a member of the Quad, in the event of a rise in the Chinese hostilities on its borders, India can count on the support of the other Quad nations to counter it. In addition, India can even take the help of its naval front and conduct strategic explorations in the Indo-Pacific region.

In March 2021, US President Joe Biden hosted the first-ever summit of the Quad leaders in a virtual format. The summit vowed to strive for an Indo-Pacific region, that is free, open, inclusive, and unconstrained by coercion.

Although the Quad does not exist simply to counter China or its influence, the aggressiveness, the coercive nature with which, China tries to press its claims, is discussed with the allies and partners of India, and inside the Quad. The Quad arrangement gives India an opportunity to work multilaterally on all kinds of initiatives that can help create, a free and open Indo-Pacific region.

In November 2017, India, Japan, the US, and Australia gave shape to the long-pending proposal of setting up the Quad, to develop a new strategy to keep the critical sea routes in the resource-rich Indo-Pacific, free of any influence, amidst China’s growing military presence in the strategic region. In the recent past India, the US, and several other world powers have been talking about the need to ensure, a free, open, and thriving Indo-Pacific, in the backdrop of China’s rising military maneuvering in the resource-rich region.

It is important to note here that, China claims nearly all of the disputed South China Sea, though Taiwan, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, and Vietnam all claim parts of it. Beijing has also built artificial islands and military installations in the South China Sea. China also has territorial disputes with Japan in the East China Sea.

Joseph Nye’s Views On China’s Muscle Flexing

Harvard luminary Joseph Nye Jr. is hopeful that despite China’s muscle flexing, ultimately it will refrain from using hard power despite its declaration from Mao Tse Tung to Xi-Jinping that Taiwan remains a renegade province and must be united with the motherland. Nye, however, believes that the cost of a military adventure in Taiwan would be self-defeating due to the complex politico-economic inter-relationship between China and the rest of the world. China is more likely to adopt Nye’s policy of soft and smart power.

In Nye’s words paraphrased in an article in Project Syndicate with the title Whatever Happened to Soft Power?: “Soft power is the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment. A country’s soft power rests on its resources of culture, values, and policies. A smart power strategy combines hard and soft power resources. Public diplomacy has a long history as a means of promoting a country’s soft power and was essential in winning the cold war. The current struggle against transnational terrorism is a struggle to win hearts and minds, and the current overreliance on hard power alone is not the path to success. A public diplomacy is an important tool in the arsenal of smart power, but smart public diplomacy requires an understanding of the roles of credibility, self-criticism, and civil society in generating soft power.”

Joseph Nye wrote “ Soft power is not the only or even the most important source of power, because its effects tend to be slow and indirect. But to ignore or neglect it is a serious strategic and analytic mistake. The Roman Empire’s power rested not only on its legions but also on the attraction of Roman culture and law. Similarly, as a Norwegian analyst once described it, the American presence in Western Europe after World War II was “an empire by invitation.” No barrage of artillery brought down the Berlin Wall; it was removed by hammers and bulldozers wielded by people who had been touched by Western soft power. Smart political leaders have long understood that values can create power. If I can get you to want what I want, I will not have to force you to do what you do not want to do. If a country represents values that others find attractive, it can economize on the use of sticks and carrots. A country’s soft power comes primarily from three sources: its culture; its political values, such as democracy and human rights (when it upholds them); and its policies (when they are seen as legitimate because they are framed with an awareness of others’ interests). A government can influence others through the example of how it behaves at home (such as by protecting a free press and the right to protest), in international institutions (consulting others and fostering multilateralism), and through its foreign policy (such as by promoting development and human rights)”.

Joseph Nye adds that China has a smart-power problem. After all, it is difficult to practice vaccine diplomacy and “wolf-warrior diplomacy” (aggressive, coercive browbeating of smaller countries) at the same time. True, international polls showed that the US also suffered a decline in soft power during Donald Trump’s presidency. But, fortunately, America is more than its government. Unlike hard-power assets (such as armed forces), many soft-power resources are separate from the government and are only partly responsive to its purposes. For example, Hollywood movies showcasing independent women or protesting minorities inspire others around the world. So, too, does the charitable work of US foundations and the freedom of inquiry at American universities. Firms, universities, foundations, churches, and protest movements develop soft power of their own. Sometimes their activities will reinforce official foreign-policy goals, and sometimes they will be at odds with them. Either way, these private sources of soft power are increasingly important in the age of social media. The January 6, 2021, insurrection at the US Capitol certainly damaged US soft power. But those who would mourn the death of American democracy prematurely should bear in mind that the 2020 election drew an unprecedented turnout despite the pandemic. The American people are still able to unseat a demagogue in a free and fair election. This is not to suggest that all is well with American democracy or its soft power. Trump eroded many democratic norms that now must be restored.

President Joe Biden, China And The Monroe Doctrine

A contrary view is held by John Mearsheimer of Cornel University who thinks that China will seek the equivalent of a Monroe doctrine in Asia (ie. to be the unchallenged hegemon in its neighborhood). This will pose a security dilemma problem, likely leading to an Asian arms race. It will also motivate a ‘balancing coalition’ to resist Beijing’s dominance. The US, which will likely lead such a coalition, will respond with ‘containment’ efforts and other strategies, practiced in the Cold War. Unlike central Europe in the Cold War, Asia’s expansive geography (especially in the maritime domain) will create lower barriers to conflict. In a sprawling, largely oceanic theatre of operations, security actors may feel that conflicts can be ‘managed’. Perversely, because the perceived cost and threat of nuclear escalation is lower than in Cold War Europe, this will reduce trigger thresholds and heighten dangers. Even more perilous is the ‘unbalanced multi-polarity structure likely to arise in Asia where China clearly dominates several smaller — but still powerful — regional states.

Mearsheimer is particularly concerned about the morphing of Chinese nationalism into hyper-nationalism since 1989. This is the displacement of the ‘victor mentality’ into ‘aggrieved victimhood’, dwelling on historical injustice. Hypernationalism has replaced ideology. It goes beyond patriotism and exceptionalism; it is hatred of ‘the Other’, something regrettably all too common in Asia. Chinese strategic philosophy values offensive realism as much as, or even more than, the US and USSR. China will seek the equivalent of a Monroe doctrine in Asia (ie. to be the unchallenged hegemon in its neighborhood). This will pose a security dilemma problem, likely leading to an Asian arms race. It will also motivate a ‘balancing coalition’ to resist Beijing’s dominance. The US, which will likely lead such a coalition, will respond with ‘containment’ efforts and other strategies such as ‘rollback’ and ‘bait & bleed’, well-practiced in the Cold War. We can therefore expect to see a mutual hardening of rhetoric and positions in the security competition. Unlike central Europe in the Cold War, Asia’s expansive geography (especially in the maritime domain) will create lower barriers to conflict. In a sprawling, largely oceanic theatre of operations, security actors may feel that conflicts can be ‘managed’. Perversely, because the perceived cost and threat of nuclear escalation is lower than in Cold War Europe, this will reduce trigger thresholds and heighten dangers. Even more perilous is the ‘unbalanced multi-polarity structure likely to arise in Asia where China clearly dominates several smaller — but still powerful — regional states. This is the worst possible architecture of all inter-state relations.

Mearsheimer is not very certain of the Chinese intention to accept a ‘rule-based” world where China does not get its preferred seat at the highest level. The risk is more likely because Xi-Jinping lacks the experience that Joseph Stalin at the Yalta Conference, Leonid Brezhnev, and his successors had in dealing with US Presidents during the Cold War. Besides confrontation with the US over Taiwan regarded by China as a renegade province that remains to be integrated with mainland China is always a possibility. China may be further emboldened by the “decline” of the US and the induction of multi-polarity in global politics. One hopes that given the complexity pervading the world today and the will of the people of the world for peace and tranquility, no country will be foolish enough to push the nuclear button ensuring the extinction of humanity.

Friday, July 7, 2023

United Nations building in New York

United Nations building in New York

Is The United Nations Still Effective? – OpEd

June 23, 2023 0 Comments

By Ambassador Kazi Anwarul Masud

Due to the tensions that have arisen in the US, China, and Russia in particular threatening peace and tranquility in the rest of the world question has arisen about the effectiveness of the United Nations.

Going back to the defeat of Germany in the Second World War and then the immediate task of the victorious powers of the division of Germany one cannot but refer to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals of October 1944 to be known as the United Nations which would consist of 1) a General Assembly composed of all the members, 2) a Security Council of eleven members, of which five would be permanent and the other six would be chosen by the General Assembly for two-year terms, 3) an International Court of Justice, and 4) a Secretariat.

An Economic and Social Council, working under the authority of the General Assembly, was also provided for. The essence of the plan was that responsibility for preventing future war should be conferred upon the Security Council. The actual method of voting in the Security Council — an all-important question — was left open at Dumbarton Oaks for future discussion.

Another important feature of the Dumbarton Oaks plan was that member states were to place armed forces at the disposal of the Security Council, if needed, to prevent war or suppress acts of aggression. The absence of such a force, it was generally agreed, had been a fatal weakness in the older League of Nations. The Dumbarton Oaks proposals were fully discussed throughout the Allied countries. The British Government issued a detailed commentary, and in the United States, the Department of State distributed 1,900,000 copies of the text and arranged for speakers, radio programs, and motion picture films to explain the proposals. Comments and constructive criticisms came from several governments, e.g., Australia, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, the Union of South Africa, the USSR, the United Kingdom, and the United States. (History of the United Nations). At the time of the Dumbarton Oaks China was Ching Kai Shek’s Taiwan and not Mao Tse Tung’s China which remains today as a rich and powerful country presided over by Xi-Jinping’s authoritarian regime.

Jessica Chen Weiss of Cornell University and an expert on China in a recent article in Foreign Affairs magazine (China Trap- U.S. Foreign Policy and the Perilous Logic of Zero-Sum Competition) has pointed out the difficulty faced by both the US and China stemming from the inability of Western powers to read the mind of Xi-Jinping who holds absolute power in China in all spheres of the life of Chinese people.

In his present term, Xi-Jinping has surpassed Mao Tse Tung whose understanding of the strategy of US President Richard Nixon was more pragmatic than one would have expected from a revolutionary. In April this year in a long conversation with the prestigious British magazine The Economist, Henry Kissinger spoke of how to prevent a US and China war. Kissinger expressed his alarm about China’s and America’s intensifying competition for technological and economic pre-eminence.

“We’re in the classic pre-world War I situation,” Kissenger says, “where neither side has much margin of political concession and in which any disturbance of the equilibrium can lead to catastrophic consequences.” Mr. Kissinger believes that AI will become a key factor in security within five years. He compares its disruptive potential to the invention of printing, which spread ideas that played a part in causing the devastating wars of the 16th and 17th centuries. “[We live] in a world of unprecedented destructiveness,” Mr Kissinger warns. Despite the doctrine that a human should be in the loop, automatic and unstoppable weapons may be created. “If you look at military history, you can say, it has never been possible to destroy all your opponents, because of limitations of geography and of accuracy. Now, he says, there are no limitations. Every adversary is 100% vulnerable.”

Kissinger also cautioned against misinterpreting China’s ambitions. In Washington, “They say China wants world domination…The answer is that they in China want to be powerful,” he says. “They’re not heading for world domination in a Hitlerian sense,” he says. “That is not how they think or have ever thought of world order.” In Nazi Germany war was inevitable because Adolf Hitler needed it. but China is different. He has met many Chinese leaders, starting with Mao Zedong. He did not doubt their ideological commitment, but this has always been welded onto a keen sense of their country’s interests and capabilities. Kissinger sees the Chinese system as more Confucian than Marxist. That teaches Chinese leaders to attain the maximum strength of which their country is capable and to seek to be respected for their accomplishments. Chinese leaders want to be recognized as the international system’s final judges of their own interests.

In China Trap, Jessica Chen Wiess gives credit to President Joe Biden’s administration for acknowledging that the United States and its partners must provide an attractive alternative to what China is offering, and it has taken some steps in the right direction, such as multilateral initiatives on climate and hunger. Yet the instinct to counter every Chinese initiative, project, and provocation remains predominant, crowding out efforts to revitalize an inclusive international system that would protect U.S. interests and values even as global power shifts and evolves.

Even with the war in Ukraine claiming considerable U.S. attention and resources, the conflict’s broader effect has been to intensify focus on geopolitical competition, reinforced by Chinese-Russian convergence. Leaders in both Washington and Beijing claim to want to avoid a new Cold War. The fact is that their countries are already engaged in a global struggle. The United States seeks to perpetuate its preeminence and an international system that privileges its interests and values; China sees U.S. leadership as weakened by hypocrisy and neglect, providing an opening to force others to accept its influence and legitimacy. On both sides, there is growing fatalism that a crisis is unavoidable and perhaps even necessary: that mutually accepted rules of fair play and coexistence will come only after the kind of eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation that characterized the early years of the Cold War—survival of which was not guaranteed then and would be even less assured now. In Washington and Beijing, there is growing fatalism that a crisis is perhaps necessary.

In the aftermath of the Shangrila Dialogue in Singapore held this year, President Joe Biden held firm that Antony Blinken, Biden’s Secretary of State should go to China ahead of Janet Yellen, Biden’s Treasury Secretary and Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo. The Chinese were more interested in getting concrete results for both economic growth and domestic consumption. Chinese unease remains as does its belief that the US despite its policy of “ Strategic Ambiguity” relating to Taiwan is determined to contain its rise as a superpower. In March last year, US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan warned China that helping the Russian invasion of Ukraine would cost China despite Sino-Russian “ limitless” friendship.

It is believed that China was caught off guard by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It is also incompatible with Chinese policy because they are incompatible with the way China views war. Beijing prefers extracting concessions through coercion over the use of force and with Ukraine menaced by tens of thousands of Russian troops along its borders, China didn’t expect Putin to invade “because they didn’t think he needed to.”

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, where it has recognized two breakaway republics, has challenged fundamental principles of Chinese foreign policy particularly noninterference in other countries’ affairs, and respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. “If the concept of sovereignty means anything in practice to a country like China she would be expected to stand up and to speak out. In formulating its response, China has had to consider the implications for Taiwan.

If China explicitly endorsed the separatists’ plans, against Ukrainian sovereignty, then logically the Japanese, Americans, and others can make similar claims in Taiwan. That’s the kind of logic that the Chinese government would like to avoid. As mentioned earlier Jessica Chen Weiss in her article China Trap appears to be pessimistic. She thinks that Beijing is beginning to believe that coercion may be necessary to halt Taiwan’s permanent separation. Although Beijing continues to prefer peaceful unification, it is coming to believe that coercive measures may be necessary to halt moves toward Taiwan’s permanent separation and compel steps toward unification, particularly given the Chinese perception that Washington’s support for Taiwan is a means to contain China. Even if confidence in China’s military and economic trajectory leads Beijing to believe that “time and momentum” remain on its side, political trends in Taiwan and in the United States make officials increasingly pessimistic about prospects for peaceful unification. Beijing has not set a timetable for seizing Taiwan and does not appear to be looking for an excuse to do so.

Besides given the $700 billion in trade between the United States and China, the U.S. business community “remains focused on the importance of the relationship,” said the senior State Department official. “U.S. businesspeople are likely to ask for a reduction in tensions so there is lower risk and lower acrimony for their businesses in China,” said Daniel Russel, a China expert at the Asia Society. The most urgent goal for U.S. officials is restoring military-to-military channels with Beijing following multiple dangerous close calls in recent months, including a near-collision of warships near Taiwan and an aggressive fighter jet flyby over the South China Sea.

Beijing recently rejected a U.S. offer for Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin to meet his Chinese counterpart doubting the “sincerity” of the invitation. Chinese officials are still upset about the punishments the United States imposed on the Chinese Defense Minister in 2018 for buying arms from Russia. They also view Washington’s deployment of air and naval assets to the South China Sea as an affront to China’s-sovereignty and believe that improving communications with Washington will simply make the Pentagon more comfortable operating in East Asia.

Yet one has to take into consideration that the world today is neither unipolar nor bipolar. Multipolarity has taken center stage and the US has to take the help of other countries of NATO and the European Union as China has to take into account help from Russia and others who either voted in favor of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in the UN Resolution or those who had abstained. In any case, the world would not accept the extinction of humanity just because a few countries possess nuclear weapons.

Home Kazi Anwarul Masud Can The Chinese Rise as a Superpower Lead to a Nuclear War?

Can The Chinese Rise as a Superpower Lead to a Nuclear War?

By Sri Lanka Guardian•July 02, 2023•China Diplomacy Essays feature Kazi Anwarul Masud•Comments : 0

No one can be certain about the future trajectory of any country’s soft power. But there is no doubt that influence through attraction will remain an important component of world politics.

by Kazi Anwarul Masud

ESTABLISHMENT OF QUAD

According to Dr. Prabhakar Deshpande, an Indian analyst the origin of QUAD can be traced back to the evolution of Exercise Malabar and the 2004 Tsunami, when India conducted relief and rescue operations for itself and neighboring countries and was later joined by US, Japan, and Australia. Obviously feeling endangered, China issued formal diplomatic protests to the members of the Quad. Followed by this, Australia withdrew in 2008 from the forum, ostensibly, due to political pressure from the Chinese government, but in 2010, Australia again joined the Quad’s naval exercises & enhanced military cooperation between the US and Australia was resumed. Japanese PM Shinzo Abe , in 2012, emphasized the idea of Asia’s ‘Democratic Security Diamond’, comprising the US, Japan, India, and Australia. Following this, in 2017, the first official talks under the Quad took place in the Philippines. The motive behind the Quad is believed by Dr. Deshpande to keep the strategic sea routes in the Indo-Pacific, free of any military or political influence. It is basically seen as a strategic grouping, aimed at reducing the Chinese domination.

Pannaros Boonserm works at a construction site of the China-Thailand railway in Nakhon Ratchasima province, Thailand, Feb. 23, 2023. (Xinhua/Wang Teng)

CORE OBJECTIVE OF QUAD

The core objective of the Quad is, to secure a rules-based global order, freedom of navigation, and, a liberal trading system. The coalition also aims to offer, alternative debt financing for nations in the Indo-Pacific region. It is believed, that the forum strategically counters China’s economic and military rise. As a member of the Quad, in the event of a rise in the Chinese hostilities on its borders, India can take the support of the other Quad nations to counter it. In addition, India can even take the help of its naval front and conduct strategic explorations in the Indo-Pacific region. In March 2021, US President Joe Biden hosted the first-ever summit of the Quad leaders in a virtual format. The summit vowed to strive for an Indo-Pacific region, that is free, open, inclusive, and unconstrained by coercion.

PRESIDENT JOE BIDEN’S SUMMIT MEETING WITH QUAD LEADERS

On September 24, 2021, US President Joe Biden hosted the first-ever in-person summit of the Quad leaders. The summit vowed to strive for an Indo-Pacific region that is free, open, inclusive, and unconstrained by coercion, sending an apparent message to China. At President Biden’s invitation, the Quad summit, attended by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his counterparts, Scott Morrison from Australia and Yoshihide Suga from Japan, announced initiatives to take on common challenges, amidst muscle flexing by an assertive China in the strategic region. Although the Quad does not exist simply to counter China or its influence, the aggressiveness, the coercive nature with which, China tries to press its claims, is discussed with the allies and partners of India, and inside the Quad. The Quad arrangement gives India an opportunity to work multilaterally on all kinds of initiatives that can help create, a free and open Indo-Pacific region. In November 2017, India, Japan, the US, and Australia gave shape to the long-pending proposal of setting up the Quad, to develop a new strategy to keep the critical sea routes in the resource-rich Indo-Pacific, free of any influence, amidst China’s growing military presence in the strategic region. In the recent past India, the US, and several other world powers have been talking about the need to ensure, a free, open, and thriving Indo-Pacific, in the backdrop of China’s rising military maneuvering in the resource-rich region. It is important to note here that, China claims nearly all of the disputed South China Sea, though Taiwan, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, and Vietnam all claim parts of it. Beijing has also built artificial islands and military installations in the South China Sea. China also has territorial disputes with Japan in the East China Sea.

JOSEPH NYE’S VIEWS ON CHINA’S MUSCLE FLEXING

Harvard luminary Joseph Nye J’ is hopeful that despite China’s muscle flexing ultimately China would refrain from using hard power despite its declaration from Mao Tse Tung to Xi-Jinping that Taiwan remains a renegade province and must be united with the motherland. Joseph Nye however believes that the cost of a military adventure in Taiwan would be self-defeating due to the complex politico-economic inter-relationship between China and the rest of the world. China is more likely to adopt Joseph Nye’s policy of soft and smart power. In Nye’s words paraphrased “ Soft power is the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment. A country’s soft power rests on its resources of culture, values, and policies. A smart power strategy combines hard and soft power resources. Public diplomacy has a long history as a means of promoting a country’s soft power and was essential in winning the cold war. The current struggle against transnational terrorism is a struggle to win hearts and minds, and the current overreliance on hard power alone is not the path to success. A public diplomacy is an important tool in the arsenal of smart power, but smart public diplomacy requires an understanding of the roles of credibility, self-criticism, and civil society in generating soft power”. In an article in Project Syndicate in January last year titled Whatever Happened to Soft Power?

VIEWS OF JOSEPH NYE ON SOFT YEAR

CHINA’S SMART POWER PROBLEM

PRESIDENT JOE BIDEN THINKS CHINA SEEKS MONRO DOCTRINE EQUIVALENT IN ASIA

Biden has made strengthening democracy at home and abroad a goal of his presidency, but the results remain to be seen. No one can be certain about the future trajectory of any country’s soft power. But there is no doubt that influence through attraction will remain an important component of world politics. A contrary view is held by John Mearsheimer of Cornel University. He thinks that China will seek the equivalent of a Monroe doctrine in Asia (ie. to be the unchallenged hegemon in its neighborhood). This will pose a security dilemma problem, likely leading to an Asian arms race. It will also motivate a ‘balancing coalition’ to resist Beijing’s dominance. The US, which will likely lead such a coalition, will respond with ‘containment’ efforts and other strategies, practiced in the Cold War. Unlike central Europe in the Cold War, Asia’s expansive geography (especially in the maritime domain) will create lower barriers to conflict. In a sprawling, largely oceanic theatre of operations, security actors may feel that conflicts can be ‘managed’. Perversely, because the perceived cost and threat of nuclear escalation is lower than in Cold War Europe, this will reduce trigger thresholds and heighten dangers. Even more perilous is the ‘unbalanced multi-polarity structure likely to arise in Asia where China clearly dominates several smaller — but still powerful — regional states.

MEARSHEIMER’S CONCERN ABOUT CHINESE HYPER-NATIONALISM

MEARSHEIMER’S DOUBT OF CHINESE ACCEPTANCE OF A “RULE-BASED” WORLD

Kazi Anwarul Masud is a retired Bangladeshi diplomat. During his tenure, he worked in several countries as the ambassador of Bangladesh including Thailand, Vietnam, South Korea and Germany