Flags of Saudi Arabia and Israel.

Saudi Arabia’s Quest For Peace With Israel – OpEd

 June 13, 2024  0 Comments

By Ambassador Kazi Anwarul Masud

Saudi Arabia has always sought peace with Israel, although it dreaded the consequences of publicizing its intent. In 1965, the Arab public ridiculed Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba when he proposed to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict based on the United Nations’ 1947 partition plan. Given the slow-paced and cautious Saudi foreign policy and its aversion to making dramatic decisions, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman realized the need to prepare the Saudi people for active peace with Israel after decades of vilifying Jews and condemning Israel’s existence. He delegated the task of re-socializing the population to the local media, invariably reflecting and rationalizing official foreign policy shifts.

 This paper traces the origins of Saudi peace endeavors with Israel even before the state’s establishment in 1948 and MBS’ hopes for normalization. It then sheds light on the Saudi people’s opposition to peace with Israel, which mandated the government’s decision to use the local media to convince them of the merits of peace, given the Saudi royals’ traditional emphasis on securing broad consensus before making consequential decisions. 

Saudi Peace Track Palestine caught the attention of Ibn Saud amid the rising strife between Arabs and Jews in the 1930s. However, given his preoccupation with consolidating his rule in Arabia and maintaining relations with Britain and the United States, he was uninterested in what happened there. Despite Ibn Saud’s Wahhabi legacy and its blatant hostility not only to Christians and Jews but also to other Islamic groups, he determined his position on the Jews and Zionism based on protecting the strategic interests of his kingdom in the Arabian Peninsula, as he had no ambitions to expand the scope of his rule outside it. Palestine did not mean a lot to him. One of the essential principles of Ibn Saud’s policy was cooperation with Britain and the United States to ensure that the balance of power in the Middle East would not tilt in favor of his Hashemite rivals in Iraq and Jordan at the expense of his fledgling kingdom. Ibn Saud resisted making any sacrifices on behalf of the Palestinians that might harm Saudi Arabia, and his aid to the Palestinians consisted of minimal money and weapons, which he sent secretly to them. Ibn Saud believed in the possibility of coexistence between Arabs and Jews with the help of Britain, which was responsible for regional security. In the 1940s, Ibn Saud worked within the Arab League to reject proposals that would harm the interests of the United States and Britain, avoided commitments to provide significant aid to the Palestinians, and opposed war against the Jews. 

In 1948, when Israel declared its independence and the Arab League armies invaded Palestine, Ibn Saud contented himself with symbolic participation by sending a small, untrained contingent under Egyptian command, which contributed little to the Arab war effort. The dramatic regional developments after the defeat of the Arab armies prompted Ibn Saud to cease interference in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Saudi leadership subtly welcomed Egypt’s signing of the Camp David Peace Accords with Israel in 1978. 

SAUDIS BEGAN TO SEE IRAN AND NOT ISRAEL AS BIGGEST STRATEGIC THREAT

Nevertheless, the success of the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and Tehran’s efforts to export it to the Arab region triggered the Iraq-Iran war in 1980. The Saudis began to see Iran, not Israel, as their biggest strategic security threat. In 1981, then-Saudi Crown Prince Fahd presented a peace proposal at a summit in Morocco that included establishing a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, with East Jerusalem as its capital, in exchange for providing guarantees for peace among all countries in the region. However, the summit ended abruptly four hours after its start due to the refusal of Syria, Iraq, Algeria and Libya to accept the security of Israel. The gathering reconvened a year later and implicitly recognized Israel’s right to exist, provided it agreed to establish a Palestinian state and dismantle West Bank settlements. 

Twenty years later, Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah presented an initiative at the Beirut summit that demanded Israel’s withdrawal from the Golan Heights and the establishment of a Palestinian state in exchange for comprehensive normalization. However, Syria objected to normalization and substituted it with peace because normalization belongs to the people and not to governments. Peace and Its Discontents In 2016, MBS launched Vision 2030 to transform Saudi Arabia economically, culturally and socially. Soon after King Salman designated him as crown prince, he set out to consolidate his domestic powers and pursue the challenging task of modernization through economic diversification away from oil, which had eluded Saudi kings since 1970.

 He believed in the necessity of making peace with economically developed and technologically vibrant Israel to fulfill his desire to transform Saudi Arabia into a modern country. However, MBS became concerned about the Saudis’ reaction to making peace with Israel. His fears came true with the publication of a recent public opinion poll. The survey, carried out by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy a few weeks after Hamas’ October attack, showed that most respondents saw Israel as a weak and divided state. The overwhelming majority of them believed the ongoing war between Israel and Hamas was a victory for Arabs and Muslims. Almost all respondents also agreed on the necessity for Arab and Islamic countries that recognize Israel to immediately sever all diplomatic, political and economic relations with it. Strikingly, only 16 percent of Saudi respondents said that Hamas should stop calling for the destruction of Israel and accept a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders. The Media Joins In Saudi newspapers do not hide the kingdom’s desire to achieve peace with Israel because it is in line with the country’s initiatives since 1981, which Riyadh associates with achieving a just, comprehensive and sustainable solution to the Palestinian issue. Saudi media condemned what Hamas did last October, stressing that Hamas must understand that Arabs reject it. Saudi Arabia views Hamas as living in a grand illusion, including the futility of its project to establish a Palestinian state from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea. 

Some Saudi newspapers compared the Hamas attack on Oct. 7 to the 9/11 attacks, proposing that there was a hidden goal for Hamas to sabotage Saudi intentions to solve the Palestinian problem. Saudi media discourse shows solidarity with Gaza’s civilians and demonization of Hamas. It also criticizes the extremeness of the Israeli military campaign, even though the Saudi Al Arabiya TV channel extensively covered the horrific stories of the victims of the Hamas attacks. Saudi criticism of Israel does not hide the fact that according to research firm Oil Change International, Saudi Arabia sent 151 oil shipments to Israel during the first six months of the war. The Saudi media presents itself as merely an observer of the war in Gaza, yet tacitly suggests that the kingdom keeps the door open for normalization with Israel and that the ball is in its court. The Saudi media focuses on legitimizing normalization with Israel, whose preconditions vacillate between Palestinian statehood and improving the Palestinians’ quality of life. What is striking is the frequent appearance of Israeli officials and analysts on Al Arabiya, which is an implicit indicator of Israel’s gradual introduction into the Saudi public. Most Saudis do not know anything about Israel other than what they have learned over the decades since its establishment and the emergence of the refugee problem. The late King Faisal’s portrayal of Zionists, in addition to communists, as perpetrators of a cosmic conspiracy played a significant role in shaping the Saudi collective consciousness about Jews in general and Zionism in particular. The Saudi media never mentioned Israel except to warn against it, overwhelming majority of them believed the ongoing war between Israel and Hamas was a victory for Arabs and Muslims. Almost all respondents also agreed on the necessity for Arab and Islamic countries that recognize Israel to immediately sever all diplomatic, political and economic relations with it. Strikingly, only 16 percent of Saudi respondents said that Hamas should stop calling for the destruction of Israel and accept a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders. The Media Joins In Saudi newspapers do not hide the kingdom’s desire to achieve peace with Israel because it is in line with the country’s initiatives since 1981, which Riyadh associates with achieving a just, comprehensive and sustainable solution to the Palestinian issue. Saudi media condemned what Hamas did last October, stressing that Hamas must understand that Arabs reject it. Saudi Arabia views Hamas as living in a grand illusion, including the futility of its project to establish a Palestinian state from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea. Some Saudi newspapers compared the Hamas attack on Oct. 7 to the 9/11 attacks, proposing that there was a hidden goal for Hamas to sabotage Saudi intentions to solve the Palestinian problem. Saudi media discourse shows solidarity with Gaza’s civilians and demonization of Hamas. It also criticizes the extremeness of the Israeli military campaign, even though the Saudi Al Arabiya TV channel extensively covered the horrific stories of the victims of the Hamas attacks. Saudi criticism of Israel does not hide the fact that according to research firm Oil Change International, Saudi Arabia sent 151 oil shipments to Israel during the first six months of the war. The Saudi media presents itself as merely an observer of the war in Gaza, yet tacitly suggests that the kingdom keeps the door open for normalization with Israel and that the ball is in its court. The Saudi media focuses on legitimizing normalization with Israel, whose preconditions vacillate between Palestinian statehood and improving the Palestinians’ quality of life. 

What is striking is the frequent appearance of Israeli officials and analysts on Al Arabiya, which is an implicit indicator of Israel’s gradual introduction into the Saudi public. Most Saudis do not know anything about Israel other than what they have learned over the decades since its establishment and the emergence of the refugee problem. The late King Faisal’s portrayal of Zionists, in addition to communists, as perpetrators of a cosmic conspiracy played a significant role in shaping the Saudi collective consciousness about Jews in general and Zionism in particular. The Saudi media never mentioned Israel except to warn against it. Unlike the Qatar-based Al Jazeera, Al Arabiya has adopted a moderate stance toward Israel. In the past few years, former Saudi officials and pro-government social media influencers have publicly criticized the Palestinians for wasting opportunities to solve the conflict, sharing sharp posts saying “Palestine is not my issue.” A prominent Saudi journalist and advocate of normalization claimed that Israel is living in a post-9/11 atmosphere and that there is currently no room for reason in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s calculations. The journalist stressed that Netanyahu should not waste the unprecedented opportunity for peace with the kingdom. However, after the storm of post-Oct. 7 repercussions subsided, he expressed optimism about the future. The journalist mocked the senseless wars caused by Hamas since Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza in 2005 and even all the Arab-Israeli wars since 1948. He expressed dissatisfaction with the behavior of some Arab academics and intellectuals who failed the test of reason. Saudi media expressed the need to forge peace with Israel as quickly as possible, warning that the details of the agreement could derail normalization. These details lie in direct talks between Israel and the Palestinians, which could extend for years. The Saudis are fully aware that Israel will not accept Palestinian statehood based on the failure of the peace processes between the two parties, starting with the Camp David Accords in 1978, the Oslo Accords in 1993, and the Middle East Quartet’s 2003 Roadmap for Peace. Therefore, Saudi media advocates peacemaking as soon as possible and separates it from the Palestinian statehood track. The Peace Drive Goes On Saudi Arabia will not forgive Hamas for jeopardizing normalization talks with Israel. MBS bases his country’s foreign policy on the principle of Saudi Arabia first. Therefore, despite the number of Palestinian civilian deaths due to the war, no red lines stand in the way of his strategic choice to normalize relations with Israel, regardless of what happens in Gaza or the possibilities of establishing a Palestinian state. However, MBS faces a domestic challenge due to growing Saudi popular support for Hamas, which has come to embody resistance to Israel. Saudi Arabia can significantly influence. 

CONCLUSION

 Saudi Arabia will not forgive Hamas for jeopardizing normalization talks with Israel. MBS bases his country’s foreign policy on the principle of Saudi Arabia first. Therefore, despite the number of Palestinian civilian deaths due to the war, no red lines stand in the way of his strategic choice to normalize relations with Israel, regardless of what happens in Gaza or the possibilities of establishing a Palestinian state. However, MBS faces a domestic challenge due to growing Saudi popular support for Hamas, which has come to embody resistance to Israel. Saudi Arabia can significantly influence the U.S. to stop the war. But it has refrained from doing so, focusing instead on exploiting the war to pursue its interests. The Saudis want to sign a defense agreement with the United States and revive peace negotiations with Israel to establish a joint economic partnership and fulfill some of its development goals, which have hit a snag recently. The Saudis do not trust the ability of the inherently corrupt Palestinian Authority to reform itself, which is what Western countries demand as a prerequisite for talks on a two-state solution.