FAUSTIAN BARGAIN WITH NORTH KOREA IN THE OFFING?
(FOR PUBLICATION ON SUNDAY THE 20TH FEBRUARY 2005)
By Kazi Anwarul Masud (former Secretary and
ambassador)
Once again like a recurring nightmare North Korean
public acknowledgement that it possesses nuclear weapons and is pulling out of
the six nation talks on North Korean denuclearization has put the problem
ridden world in a difficult situation. Apparently the North Korean move to
strengthen her nuclear capability is to counter an alleged American plot to
overthrow the present regime in DPRK. Though President Bush in his State of the
Union address made only a passing reference to US engagement with Asian
countries “to convince North Korea to abandon its nuclear ambition”, a climb
down from his speech last year in which he described the country as a member of
the axis-of-evil, North Koreans were reportedly unhappy over Condolleeza Rice’s
branding of North Korea as an “out post of tyranny” during her confirmation
hearing as the new Secretary of State. While visiting Europe in her new
capacity very recently she voiced her apprehension that North Koreans were
“only deepening their isolation because every one in the international
community, and most especially North Korea’s neighbors, have been very clear
that there needs to be no nuclear weapons in the Korean peninsula in order to
maintain stability in that region”. She assured North Korea that the US had no
intention to attack that country, the last out post of Stalinism, an Orwellian
nightmare for its hapless citizens, a regime that thrives on asphyxiation of
its people and feeds on Draculian xenophobic nationalism in a world where
sovereignty is being increasingly pooled for politico-economic betterment of
the people. This pursuit of xenophobic nationalism stands in stark contrast to
President Bush’s promise that America will stand with her allies of freedom to
support democratic movements with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in the
world. Though President Bush’s promise to usher in democratic movement was primarily
aimed at the Middle East yet his attention did not waver from countries like
DPRK which posed clear and present danger to international peace and
security as DPRK had not yet graduated
from its axis-of-evil status to a country with internationally acceptable level
of civilized conduct. North Korean behavior only strengthened 1999 Richard
Armitage (former Deputy Secretary of State) Report that concluded that
brinkmanship paid. The Report warned that the 1994 Agreed Framework concluded
with the Clinton administration providing for freezing existing North Korean
nuclear program in exchange of two light water nuclear reactors and half a
million tons of heavy water annually had only created a cycle that would lead
Pyongyang to believe that it could extract concessions. Paul Wilfowitz
(currently Deputy Secretary of Defense) had expressed doubts that a regime
which cared so little for its own people would be willing to give up its
ultimate weapons of blackmail in exchange of power reactors.
Despite Ellen Bork’s (of The New American Century)
skeptical conclusion that due to divergent Sino-American interests in North
Korea US should remove China from the list of countries for “constructive
engagement” for solution of such crisis; China wants a nuclear free Korean
Peninsula, and is concerned that a nuclear North Korea could trigger a chain of
nuclearisation of South Korea, Japan and Taiwan adversely affecting Chinese
core security interests. China is also acutely aware that should North Korea
prove to be right in its belief of “an invariable ambition of the US to invade
DPRK and dominate Asia with the Korean peninsula as the spring board” then it
may be faced with American troops stationed on its border. Paradoxically China
may also find it uncomfortable with a unified Korea with the North armed with
nuclear weapons and the South with its affluence. This, however, may not be
necessarily so if one were to consider that the unified Germany with continued
membership of NATO posed not only no threat to Russia but became the largest
creditor which perhaps was an expression of gratitude by Helmut Kohl to Mikhail
Gorbachev for not obstructing the unification of Germany. The Russo-German
detente found further expression in their opposition (along with other
countries) in the UNSC to Anglo-US invasion of Iraq.
Bush administration has rejected outright the most
recent demand of DPRK for direct talks with the US outside the six-nation
negotiation on the ground that the matter is not a bilateral one but of
regional concern. A few days earlier Condoleeza Rice while on her European tour
assured that “North Koreans should have no reason to believe that any one wants
to attack them. The President of the United States said in South Korea that the
US has no intention to attack North Korea (and) they can have multilateral
security assurances if they will make the important decision to give up their
nuclear weapons program”. Yet one should be reminded of President Bush’s
unequivocal declaration of May 2003 that “we will not tolerate nuclear weapons
in North Korea. We will not give in to blackmail. We will not settle for
anything less than complete, verifiable, and irreversible elimination of North
Korean nuclear program”.
Though US and regional powers’ views on North
Korean question coincide, a larger issue of future Sino-American relationship
may have direct relevance to the current situation. President Carter’s national
security advisor Zbigniew Brezinski thinks that in the near future China is
unlikely to challenge the US militarily and will remain focused on economic
development and winning acceptance as a great power. Despite Taiwan issue
Brezinski considers it unlikely that China will adopt a confrontational policy
that could disrupt its phenomenal economic growth and also shake the grip of
the communist party over the Chinese people. But Professor John Mearsheimer (of
Chicago University) believes that China is likely to dominate Asia in the same
way that the US dominated the Western Europe. He believes that an increasingly
powerful China is likely to push the US out of Asia as the US pushed the
European great powers out of western hemisphere. Professor Marsheimer theorizes
that mightiest states attempt to establish hegemony in their region while
making sure that no rival great power dominates another region. The great
power, he adds, do not merely want to be the strongest power, their ultimate
aim is to be the hegemon—the only great power in the system. It should,
however, be noted that hegemony is a consensual order which can decline as a
result of legitimacy deficit of the hegemon though its coercive powers remain
intact or even can increase. As Iraq invasion has amply proved Bush
administration’s emphasis on “hard power” as defined by Harvard Professor
Joseph Nye in terms of military and economic powers as opposed to “soft power”
in terms of values, culture, ideology and institutions has cost the US the
possibility of assuming the role of global hegemon despite its unchallengeable
military prowess. Mearsheimer argues that China thirty years from now with a
much larger GDP and a more formidable army may try to push the US out of
Asia—an argument dismissed by Brezinski as China’s neighbors including India,
Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Russia and Vietnam may join the US to contain the
Chinese power. Echoing Brezinski Thomas Donnelly (of the American Enterprise
Institute) believes that while China has the potential to become the canonical
“global peer” of the US the global “correlation of forces” is in favor of
American preeminence. While all these futuristic scenarios are in the realm of
speculation it is unlikely that in the North Korean case China would dissociate
itself from its stated position of denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula.
The question that agitates many minds is why North
Korea is so insistent on acquiring nuclear weapons so vehemently opposed by the
international community. Political analyst Philip Saunders provides several
scenarios. In his first scenario the North Korean leaders have already decided
that possession of nuclear weapons is essential for their survival. They also
believe that had Saddam Hussein possessed WMD then the Anglo-American forces
would not have dared to attack Iraq. In Saunders’ second scenario DPRK would be
willing to barter away their nuclear weapons in exchange of iron clad guarantee
that the US would not attack DPRK to effect a regime change. In the third
scenario DPRK would like to possess both the nuclear weapons and also have
normal relations with the US and regional powers. Such a case would mean
international recognition of DPRK as a nuclear power. It would also mean that
possession of WMD is the surest way to ensure sovereignty, nullify NPT and
subsequent non-proliferation measures.
How would then the US as the global hegemon deal
with crisis like that of North Korean nuclearisation? British historian Nial
Ferguson (Colossus: The Price of American Empire-2004) would like the US, like
the UK before it, to act as an empire. Ferguson perhaps goes beyond the
neo-cons of Bush administration and observes that if the US does not embrace
history’s charge and acknowledges itself as an empire the world could suffer “
a new Dark Age of warring empires and religious fanaticism…of economic
stagnation and retreat of civilization into a few fortified enclaves”. He
argues that if the US had sent more troops to Iraq and conducted a more
aggressive campaign of fighting the “insurgents”, as past successful empires
were not afraid to use the forces at their disposal, then the Iraqi situation
would not have turned into a quagmire that it has. Ferguson’s argument that the
US should have acted as the British had done in the centuries gone by falters
on the ground of changed realities in the world after the Second World War. Had
the strategy used by the Roman empire centuries back been possible to day then
Colin Powell in his most recent article in Foreign Policy magazine would not
have stressed on the need for “economic development in the world’s poorest
societies” because democracy, development and security are inextricably linked
with one another. Powell rightly observes that poverty breeds frustration and
resentment used by “ideological entrepreneurs” for recruiting terrorists and
that no nation “can assure the safety of its people as long as economic desperation
and injustice can mingle with tyranny and fanaticism”. The enemy shrouded in
the mystery of many identities like a chameleon, a non-state actor nursing
vitriolic hatred for democratic values on the pretext that their adornment will
be in contradistinction of “purist” interpretation of scriptural literalism, in
the words of Condoleeza Rice, “are swimming against the tide of human spirit
(and) and dwelling on the outer fringes of a great religion they are in revolt
against the future”.
Besides them the world also has aberrant nations
like North Korea who being on the brink of failure would like to blackmail the
world with apocalyptic disorder. Now that the second Bush administration
appears to have taken initiative to mend fences with transatlantic partners
derided by Robert Kagan as Americans being from Mars and the Europeans coming
from Venus and by Donald Rumsfeld as “old Europe” about those countries who differed with
Anglo-American plan to invade Iraq without UNSC sanction; Condoleza Rice during
her first visit to Europe as Secretary of State has conveyed the resolve of
President Bush to strengthen transatlantic ties.
One hopes that Nial Ferguson’s Colossus would be
willing to listen to European wisdom distilled through centuries of war and peace
in order to find solutions to the interwoven threats we face today in terms of
terrorism, proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts, failed states and
organized crimes. But if DPRK continues to be obstinate in pursuing its nuclear
ambition then the world may be faced with a country, in Richard Perle’s words,
as “the nuclear breadbasket of the world or at least the underworld of failed
states and terrorists”. In that case the Bush administration would have to make
its final determination as to whether to accept DPRK proposal for bilateral
talks or to insist on six nations talks which the North Koreans appear to have
rejected for now. In the ultimate analysis the global powers would have to
decide whether diplomatic and economic engagements with aberrant nations would
suffice to nip in the bud emerging Frankensteins or should the UNSC decide that
enough is enough and that global peace and security can not be held hostage in
the hands of few out law regimes.
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