RECENT TRENDS IN INDO-ISRAELI
RELATIONS 24.09.03
By Kazi Anwarul Masud (former Secretary
and ambassador)
Timing of Israeli Prime Minister’s first
ever official visit to India has raised eye brows in certain quarters. Had it
been some one but Ariel Sharon or had the visit taken place at a time when the
Israeli treatment of the Palestinians was less genocidal ( it is grossly brutal
at best of times) then perhaps many members of the international community
would have felt less of unease. Albeit it is every country’s prerogative to
interact with whoever it chooses to do and to invite whoever it chooses to
invite whenever it wants. After all it is the essence of sovereignty. Yet
international relations are not conducted on the basis of exceptionalism nor purely
based on narrow definition of a state’s self interest. History of Indo- Israeli
relations is a testimony to this internationally practiced principle.
India recognized Israel in September
1950 but established embassy level relations in February 1992. The pertinent
question to be asked is why it took India four decades to send an ambassador to
Israel. India’s reticence was largely due to its perception of Israel through
Islamic prism and India’s argument that the establishment of Israel should have
had the consent of Arab inhabitants. This, perhaps. had influenced Indian
decision as a member of the UN Special Committee on Palestine ( in 1947) to
vote for a minority plan which called for the establishment of a federal
Palestine with internal autonomy for the Jewish population. When the UNGA voted
for the majority plan India joined the Arab and the Islamic world in opposing
the partition of Palestine. The 1956 Suez crisis brought Nasser and Nehru
closer in the promotion of the non-aligned movement along with Sukarno and
consequent marginalization of the Indo-Israeli relations occurred. Israel, on
its part, was indifferent towards India which was perceived to belong to the
Soviet camp and as such was opposed to US – Israeli interests in the area. It
took Rajiv Gandhi’s pragmatic and non-ideological approach which was pursued by
Narashima Rao and helped by a conjunction of international developments to
finally result in ambassadorial exchange between the two countries. The
international developments i.e. the end of the cold war, easing of
international tensions, Arab willingness to negotiate a final settlement with
Israel and most importantly India’s determination to acquire technological and
qualitative superiority of defense capability helped promote robust bilateral
relations with Israel. Surprisingly it was the same India which demanded
secrecy of Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan’s 1979 visit to India that
promoted a flurry of high level political, trade and defense related exchanges
between the two countries after 1992.
One must recognise the validity of
Indian disenchantment with the Islamic world over its totally partisan position
on Kashmir issue in favor of Pakistan. Year after year the Organization of
Islamic Conference (OIC) in almost all its meetings adopted resolutions at the
insistence of Pakistan which castigated India on Kashmir. The 9th
OIC summit at Doha , for example, recalled that the UN resolution relevant to
Jammu and Kashmir has still remained unimplemented; reaffirmed the importance
of the right of self-determination of the people enshrined in the UN Charter;
expressed concern at “ the alarming increase in the indiscriminate use of force
and gross violations of human rights committed against innocent Kashmiris”;
noted the “rejection of Indian sponsored elections” ; welcomed the “ the
restraint exercised by Pakistan on the line of control despite repeated
violations by the Indian army”etc. The tone and tenor of these resolutions,
mainly drafted by Pakistan, generated anger at Delhi and indifference over time
of these blizzards of pious declarations in pursuit of an absurd dream. India’s
disenchantment with Arab sympathy with Pakistan over Kashmir grew along with
the increase of Islamic militancy in the Arab world.
End of the cold war obviously
contributed to the reshaping of Indian foreign policy. Disappearance of the Soviet
Union meant a great loss not only of a very important supplier of defense
equipments but also its diplomatic crutch. If one glances at the events of 1971
Indo- Pakistan war over Bangladesh one can realize the seminal role played by
the Soviet Union in the birth of Bangladesh. Former Indian Foreign Secretary
J.N.Dixit in his book Liberation and Beyond stated that Soviet Union had cast
veto in favor of India seven times between December 4th and 16th
against US and other Western sponsored resolutions. The Polish and Soviet
resolutions which generally supported Bangladesh’s cause received similar
treatment from the western permanent members of the UNSC. The resolutions moved
by the USSR, US and Poland, according to Dixit, were most significant. The US
consistently demanded an immediate end to Indo-Pak hostilities; withdrawal of
their forces to pre-war boundaries etc. There was not a single reference to the
political aspirations of the Bengalese or the manner in which these should be
fulfilled in the US resolutions. The Soviet resolutions, by contrast, called
for political settlement in East Pakistan and urged Pakistan to direct its
armed forces to end all acts of violence. Dixit assessed that because of
India’s close relations and strategic
equations with the Soviet Union bolstered by the Indo-Soviet Treaty of August
1971 the UNSC was prevented from taking
any mandatory and punitive actions against India which could have frustrated
the Bangladesh freedom struggle.
The scenario described above has
evidently changed after the end of the cold war when friends and foes were
clearly identifiable. During the 1070s and 1980s US maintained close relations
with Pakistan using that country as a base for Islamic fundamentalist
guerillas’ fight against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The Soviet Union
maintained economic and defense ties with India and supported her on Kashmir
issue. But the collapse of the USSR as has already been stated left India
looking for new friends, not to supplant but to supplement, Indo-Russian
relations. Others, notably the US, despite her dire need for Pakistan in it’s
war against Afghanistan, was reassessing its relations from rhetorical to
practical terms. This was demonstrated by President Clinton’s five day visit to
India, first by a US President in decades. Though Putin’s visit to India did
not get equal media attention it was none the less a reiteration of one of the
foreign policy fundamentals of the cold war era. Albeit one has to look at
Putin visit from the point of view of per-nine-eleven complexities. During the visit
Putin and Bajpayee were looking at each other as a counter to American
pre-eminece in the world. The joint
declaration after the visit stated a preference for a “multi-polar global
structure” and opposed the “unilateral use or threat to use force in violation
of the UN Charter and intervention in the internal affairs of other states” (a
reference to US/NATO bombing of Yugoslavia). The two countries also shared
common hostility towards Islamic fundamentalism (Russia due to Chechnya and
India because of cross border terrorism in Kashmir). Putin’s visit logically
resulted in considerable arms purchase by India which still remains largely
dependent on Russia for spare parts and technical assistance.
The terrorist attacks of nine-eleven
quickened the pace of Indo-US relations through heightened relations with
Israel. Coincidentally on September 11 an Israeli defense delegation headed by
National Security Advisor was having meeting with Indian counter parts at Delhi
to discuss common security threats. A strategic partnership was being built up
fro relative obscurity to the center fold of Israeli foreign and defense
agenda. Israel started looking upon India as an extension of her parameters of
her external strategic partnership beyond the Arab “envelop” while India’s
security environment was facing a burgeoning post-cold war Sino-Pakistan
military relationship. Given Israel’s considerable role in defense development
India’s gravitation to Israel was natural. India and Israel though lacking
immediacy of threats from the common enemy faced hostile regional nations which
had acquired ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destructions and these
adversaries, in time, had the potential to become or ally themselves with
Israel’s enemies. Post nine-eleven also brought about common perception of the
two relating to counter terrorism. As Hindustan Times editorialized (September
11, 2003) both countries have known terrorism long before it became
“international”. The paper opined that Ariel Sharon’s visit to India “finally
removes the stigma that New Delhi had harbored about making its relationship
with Israel come out of the closet”.
The question which may very well be
asked as to why now the bilateral relations are advancing by leaps and bounds.
Palestine problem remains unresolved; Ariel Sharon’s targeted killing of
Palestinians and wanton destruction of property are unabated; the Middle East
Road Map ( riddled with Israeli reservations) is in tatters; Abu Mazen’s brief
tenure as Prime Minister was effectively sabotaged by Sharon’s obdurate refusal
to give him any chance to appease the militants. It has been suggested that
India’s ruling party BJP having a US oriented Pakistan obsessed foreign policy
proposes a unique “core” alliance to fight international terrorism consisting
of the US ,India and Israel for which development of relations with Israel is
of utmost necessity. Meanwhile the US has been warned of two kinds of
allies—the first type would be partner in the war on terrorism out of
convenience while the second type will consist of those countries that are
already victims of “Islamic terrorism” and there by they are opposed to
religious activism out of conviction devoid of heteroglossia of alternate
voices. Their fight against terrorism is unwavering, not duplicitous, and free
from risk of the contagion of dissonance. Perfect examples of the second kind
are India and Israel whose very existence, the argument continues, depends on
daily fight with terrorism and in the case of India the constant fight with
cross border terrorism in Kashmir.
Last tear’s January visit to India by
Foreign Minister Simon Peres to Delhi reflected a growing Israeli acknowledgement
of common perception on transnational threat by Islamic militants. This was
further fleshed out by Indian National Security Advisor Brajesh Misra while
addressing the annual dinner meeting of the American Jewish Committee in May
this year in Washington. At that dinner Misra advocated for the emergence of “a
core, consisting of democratic societies which can take on international
terrorism in a holistic and focused manner… to ensure that the global campaign
against terrorism is pursued to its logical conclusion”. He suggested that the
US, India and Israel triad or axis would form the core of this “democratic
alliance”. Misra was sharply critical of “diversionary argument” especially the
“motivated” propaganda that terrorism can only be eradicated by addressing its
rot causes. Brajesh Misra’s adamant refusal to consider the root causes of
terrorism was refuted by Kofi Anan( on 22nd September ) while addressing the Conference on Fighting
Terrorism for Humanity: A Conference on the Roots of Evil in New York. Kofi
Anan called for understanding “this deadly phenomenon and carefully examine
what works and what does not work in fighting it”. He pointed out that
terrorists are “ often rational and intentional actors who develop deliberate
strategies to achieve political objectives .We should not pretend that all
terrorists are simply insane or that decisions to resort to terrorism are
unrelated to the political, social or economic situation in which people find
themselves” He warned that the world would delude itself if it thought that
terrorism can be eliminated my military
force alone and that just because “ a few wicked men or women commit murder
does not make a cause any less just” nor does it relieve the governments of
responsibility to deal with legitimate grievances.
Brajesh Misra’s enthusiasm displayed at
the AJC annual dinner could be explained by the assistance given by AJC in the
formation of India caucus in the House of Representatives with 160 members,
perhaps the largest single country caucus formed in the Congress. Other reason
could be BJP and Likud parties’ anti-Islamism and conviction of Hindutva and
Zionism. It is doubtful whether Misra’s proposal of an anti-terrorism axis has
the support of other political parties. Opposition Congress is reported to have
found it perverse and reflective of BJP’s obsession with Israel. India’s other
political parties are also reported to be not very enthusiastic about it.
While India’s drive through Israeli
route for closer ties with the US may be congruent with its security needs and
political ambitions; one can not but wonder about the effectsf such a policy
would have on India’s 200 million Muslims; India’s relations with the Arab
world( estimated annual remittance by Indians working in the Middle East amounts
to $16 billion annually);the opportunity given to Pakistan to further intensify
its anti-Indian propaganda in the Arab world. One hopes the NDA government in
its determination to follow through the ideology of a segment of a coalition
partner would not totally disavow a policy which served India well for several
decades.
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