Wednesday, July 19, 2017

GREATER DEMOCRACY IN THE MUSLIM WORLD?( FOR PUBLICATION ON

SUNDAY THE 11TH SEPTEMBER 2005)

By Kazi Anwarul Masud( former Secretary and ambassador)

It is difficult to be sanguine if President Bush’s insistence on bringing about democracy in the Broader Middle East will ultimately serve the US interest in the conflict ridden zone which for ages has acted as a politico-cultural contestant of the West. Bush administration’s logic behind the advocacy for democracy are manifold. At one extreme the administration stung by the 9/11 terrorist attacks  have come to realize that “democracy deficit” tolerated by the successive US administrations responding to the situations demanded by the cold war resulted in dictatorial regimes in many Muslim countries where dissent often meant being sent to the gulags while profligate elites lived life of moral degeneration ultimately acted against the interest of the West. At the other end of the spectrum was the conviction of the liberal thinkers and embraced by the neo-cons that democracies do not go to war against one another simply because waging war by a democracy would need distilled approval of different branches of the administration thus making it a difficult venture. Besides in a democracy governments being ultimately accountable to the people they do not have the luxury  enjoyed by a Fascist, Nazi or a Stalinist dictator. This argument can be equally extended to a non-state actors who have made terrorism their religion. The western world, therefore, is preoccupied with Islamic fundamentalism and political Islam due to their realization that policies followed hitherto had given birth to failed states in the vacuum left by the cold war which helped incubate the vitriolic contagion of al-Qaida variety. In the panic following the 9/11 events new cold war warriors equated Islamic fundamentalism with political Islam. While Islamic fundamentalism encapsulates the emotional, spiritual and political response of the Muslims to the acute politico-economic crisis in the Middle East and the Muslims’ frustration over the inability of Pan Arab Nationalism to deliver political goods to the citizens; political Islam aims at establishing a global Islamic order through challenging the status quo within the Islamic states and through establishing a transnational net work of contacts.

Question has, however, arisen whether democratization of Muslim societies would necessarily reduce terrorism and prevent fresh recruits to the terrorist outfits. Vermont University Professor Gregory Gause holds the view that in the absence of data available showing a strong relationship between democracy and absence or reduction of terrorism, the phenomenon appears to stem from factors other than regime type. He argues that since the al-Qaidists are not fighting for democracy but for the establishment of what they believe to be a purist version of an Islamic state there is no reason to believe that a tidal wave of democracy would wash away terrorist activities. Some Middle East experts have suggested that as the root cause of al-Qaida lie in poverty and educational deficiencies in countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Pakistan, for example, caused by the authoritarian nature of the rulers the terrorist menace could have been better tackled through political reform. But a counter argument proffered by liberal thinker Paul Berman states that this approach may not succeed as al-Qaida ideology and radical Islam are driven by a fear and hatred of liberal Islam which they see as a “hideous schizophrenia” of the West that divides the state from religion and promotes individual freedom. A similar strand of argument finds that modernity rather than democracy should be used as the most important tool to fight global terrorism. Since modernity involves more than improved material conditions and entails a transformation in beliefs and philosophies, al-Qaedists with their narrow interpretation of religious dogmas interspersed with voyeuristic attractions and/or fearful retribution would lose their way in the maze of diasporic struggle for identity. But then again it has also been argued that al-Qaedist appeal is not due to lack of modernity in the Islamic society but due to its excess which in the view of so-called purists is instrumental in contributing to social “degeneration” of the western culture having contagion-effect on Muslim societies. If western libertarian values are believed to be inextricably linked with democratic values then terrorists would logically be driven not by a desire for democracy but by their opposition to foreign domination. Continuing insurgency in Iraq is a case in point. Despite American assertion to the effect that the insurgents are mainly foreigners, the insurgents are by and large Iraqi Arab Sunnis who are fighting against being dispossessed and now the list of  their grievances have been added by the new constitution rejected by the Sunnis and  to be put to a country wide referendum in mid-October. Sunni insurgency does not mean Iraqi opposition to democracy as more than half of the Iraqis went to the polls in January parliamentary elections despite threats from the insurgents not to turn up to vote.

Historian Bernard Lewis once said the democracy is a peculiarly western way of conducting business which may or may not be suitable for others. Perhaps disproving Lewis’ contention 2003 Pew Global Attitude Project found that strong majority of those surveyed in Kuwait(83 percent), Jordan(68 percent), and Palestine(53 percent) was supportive of democracy. This position was further strengthened by large voter turn out in Algeria, Palestine, Kuwaiti, and Yemeni elections. The point that comes out is that the Islamic world may be averse to accepting American policies but not American values which quintessentially are not very different from western liberal values. Citing Iraq war as an example majority of people polled in most Islamic countries are convinced that the war was motivated by Washington’s desire for oil, protect Israel (which needed no protection any way), and weaken the Islamic world.

Arabs, indeed, the entire Muslim world has a keen sense of history. Often they are reminded of Samuel Huntington’s observation: “The West won the world not by superiority of its ideas or values or religion but rather by the superiority in applying organized violence. Westerners often forget this fact, non-Westerners never do”.

If Iraq can be taken as a barometer then many Islamic countries spurred on by the US to speed up the process of democratization are more likely than not to opt for some kind of Islamic rule. Gregory Gause’s  findings show that only in Morocco where more secular leftist parties have a long history and established presence, or in Lebanon where Christian-Muslim dynamic determine electoral politics, pluralities of people surveyed in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, UAE, Egypt etc would support greater role for clergy in their political system. In Pakistan the great majority of people would, given a chance, opt for some sort of Islamic rule in addition to the increasing theocratic influence in two of the provinces ruled by the Mullahs. Bush administration would, therefore, be well advised to listen to Harvard Professor Jesica Stern that “democratization is not necessarily the best way to fight Islamic extremism”. Perhaps, Bush administration may wish to strengthen the secular and progressive forces to fight fundamentalist forces both within and outside the electoral process.

The creation of a democratic political and social order in the Islamic world would not be easy. But vigilance would have to be maintained to see that civil liberties and rule of law prevails, that state failure does not give way to extremist religious ideology, that corrupt governments do not succeed in refusing to integrate dissident groups and emerging social classes etc. In any case, hasty “democratization” of the Muslim world may not serve the interest either of the people who are being “democratized” nor of the US, the prime mover of the next democratic wave.



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