Quagmire of Al-Qaeda and Taliban

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March 02, 2010

Quagmire of Al-Qaeda and Taliban

By Kazi Anwarul Masud

http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers37/paper3695.html

WHAT if the anti-Indians Taliban were to confine their objective to terrorism in India and they were to renounce themselves against any global ambitions for regime change in wayward Muslim countries and the ‘degenerate” West for establishing Caliphate throughout the world? Would the Western world withdraw the NATO forces from Afghanistan and condemn that country and part of Pakistan to be ruled by extremist Islamic regime given their belief in one man, one vote, one time and Sharia as “the” source of law and not “a” source of law, and as an Islamic scholar states that ‘it goes without saying that it is the responsibility of every Muslim to lead his life in an Islamic state governed by the Quran and Sunnah and in a society that is established by Sharia”?

Admittedly it is difficult to believe in any such declaration by the Islamic extremists but there is a general consensus that state sponsored terrorism is more India-specific , and if Pakistan were to rein in and destroy them in totality- difficult to believe that such a thing could come to pass given that these terrorists are regarded as “freedom fighters”- and should Pakistan refuse then the US and Western world could withdraw financial and military support given to Pakistan and also impose strict sanctions, and/or give India full support in destroying the terrorists?

The Western fear that such support to India could result in (a) stoking a Indo-Pak conflict into a full fledged conflagration resulting in destabilization of South Asian region, (b) further increase anti-US sentiment in Pakistan ( US is already extremely unpopular in Pakistan and a poll suggested that 80% of Pakistanis were against US drone attacks despite the fact that some of these attacks killed the leaders of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan) and helped Pakistan army’s military operations in Waziristan and in terrorist infested areas of NWFP, and (c) enthuse some indigenous elements in Pakistan to help al-Qaeda acquire nuclear material and cause greater threat to Western interests and people. But would it necessarily be so?

Albeit the Romans ruled the world by sword which is neither practicable nor desirable in the present day world. If tectonic shift in the US foreign and defence policies, described by Madeline Albright, from Clinton administration to Bush administration and the invasion of Iraq is any lesson, then use of only hard power is likely to exacerbate a localized problem into a global issue. One wonders whether Walter Russell Meade’s thesis( Foreign Policy magazine-Carter Syndrome- Jan/Feb 2010) that US Presidents have over the years been influenced by the beliefs of first US Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton that the US should have a strong national government and a strong military to pursue a realist global policy; Woodrow Wilson while agreeing with the Hamiltonians on the need for a global foreign policy emphasized on the promotion of democracy and human rights as core of the US policy; Thomas Jefferson dissented from the globalist approach and wanted the US to minimize its commitments and dismantle the national security state; and lastly Jacksonians are populists “suspicious of Hamiltonians’ business links, Wilsonians’ do-gooding and Jeffersonians’ weakness”.

Branding Barak Obama of Carter Syndrome Walter Meade suggests that Obama comes from the old fashioned Jeffersonian wing of the Democratic Party and believes in reducing America’s costs and risks abroad by limiting US commitments and that the US can better set an example of spreading democracy abroad by practicing it at home and moderation abroad. Given Bush administration’s abject failure of its project to spread democracy abroad and devaluing American attractiveness to the world by changing the logic of the ouster of Saddam Hussein from owning weapons of mass destruction, his alleged intent to use the weapons on the West and his links with al-Qaeda, all being proved wrong, to regime change from dictatorship to pluralism( end result being sectarian conflict and a tottering democracy) Barak Obama appears to be far more practical in the use of US military power demonstrated by his approval of General Stanley McChrystal’s AfPak policy of winning the hearts and minds of the people in place of shock and awe.

Walter Meade is optimistic that Obama could extract US forces from Afghanistan and Iraq, a contemporary equivalent of “Vietnamization” policy of Richard Nixon and open up with Iran as Nixon did with radicalized Red Guard China as a follower of Jeffersonian policy of managing US concerns with lowest possible level of risk. He, however, may fail if Afghanistan remains intractable or unforeseen events turn his policy into an incoherent reversal of fortune like Jimmy Carter’s “failure” in Iran imbroglio. Carter’s defence to Meade’s article has been robust as has been that of Carter National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brezezinski.

The point of discussion here is not the success or failure of Carter administration but whether US withdrawal from AfPak region, given the facts that the core Taliban leadership is unable to provide financial and technical support to terrorists elsewhere and is hiding under intense US pressure, the rag tag forces in Somalia and Yemen can be destroyed by US hard power, assuming that a Taliban Afghanistan and part Pakistan can be bottled up and would remain satisfied with ruling their domain, and finally with the belief that India would be able, with the help of the international community, to defeat the anti-Indian terrorists both inside India and across the border, is a feasible option for the West.

A fundamental assumption in this analysis is that both Afghanistan and Pakistan being mainly tribal societies and deeply devoted to religion cannot escape Talibanization at the end of the day and also because Afghanistan will remain divided along ethnic lines and would never have liberal democracy that in any case has been totally alien to the Afghan people.

The West has also to realize that the very basis of the creation of Pakistan was on religious ground and for the better part of its independence in 1947 the country has been ruled by the military and intermittently by corrupt democratically elected government who were essentially composed of landowners, military- industrial complex or as described by South Asian expert Stephen Cohen by “moderate Oligarchy” an informal political system that ties together senior members of the military, the civil service, the key players of the judiciary and other elites-- having little love for democracy as is understood generally.

The assumption made in this paper of the declining influence of al-Qaeda in Pakistan is refuted by South Asian expert Steve Coll in his testimony to the US House Armed Services Committee in January this year said that compared to five years ago today al-Qaeda’s influence declined in North Africa and Iran but has grown in Yemen, Somalia and Pakistan. Coll speaks of the paradox that while al-Qaeda’s political and ideological support has been declining sharply in the Muslim world, it has proved to be resilient as a source of “disruptive terrorist violence”. Referring to the attack attempted aboard the flight in the US a rigorous poll conducted last year by The Program on International Policy Attitude at the University of Maryland found that in Pakistan where the US is very unpopular only 9% supported the botched airline attack and only 5% supported in Indonesia. Coll estimates Afghan Taliban fighters to be in the range of twenty five thousand added by about a thousand from Pakistan. He, however thinks that “the potential of the India focused groups, with or without clandestine cooperation from Pakistan security forces or A.Q.Central, to repeat or exceed the scale of provocative attack carried out at Mumbai in November 2008, presents in my judgment, one of the most serious current threats to US interests in the complex of the risks and dangers posed by al-Qaeda” (The Paradoxes of al-Qaeda-The New Yorker- Jan 27, 2010).

To repeat: al-Qaeda remains committed to its globalist agenda of fighting the West; the Taliban has the narrower aim of establishing its sway in Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan with little or no interest in expanding their terrorism beyond their areas; and the India-focused terrorists aim at destabilizing India’s politico-economic structure and the “liberation” of Kashmir. It is true that the three cannot be separated into water tight compartments yet broadly the aims described appear to be true. The West, therefore, should leave Afghanistan and Pakistan to its inevitable fate of becoming Talebanized and concentrate on al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb and the al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Assist India to fight India-focused terrorists in every possible way and convince Pakistan that this fight is not against Pakistan but in its own interest as the fight will also strengthen Pakistan’s fight against TTP and other Islamic extremists.

But the withdrawal of the NATO forces would be a contentious issue. Last year Pakistan had cautioned the United States against withdrawing from Afghanistan without putting in place a stable and broad-based government in the country. US National Security Adviser James Jones was unequivocally told that Pakistan was against a sudden withdrawal of allied troops from Afghanistan and that US must not repeat the mistake of past of disengaging from the region after the departure of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. The US adviser was in Pakistan for discussions on the Af-Pak strategy review and to evaluate the role Pakistan could play under the revised policy, now revealed, by the Obama administration. ‘Pakistan believes that withdrawal at this stage can frustrate efforts for bringing peace and security to the region and have serious repercussions on its security,’ the sources said. According to a statement issued by the Pak Foreign Office the need for close coordination and consultation on all issues of importance was emphasized. Pakistani leaders stressed the need for working for a broader reconciliation in Afghanistan, including engaging the Taliban. The US NSA told the civil and military leadership that the US did not plan to stay in Afghanistan for a long period and reconciliation efforts would be launched. ‘General Jones spoke of the US’ preference to simultaneously tackle the issues of governance, economic development, national integration and counter-insurgency. With differences of opinion in Washington on the issue of deploying additional troops in Afghanistan, the security adviser appeared unclear about what would be the final decision. Pakistani leaders clarified that Islamabad was not opposed to additional US troops being dispatched to the region. General Jones was told that Pakistan’s concerns primarily centred on implications of the deployment strategy for additional troops. It is believed that General Jones appeared keen to assess the health of the PPP-led government because of numerous challenges confronting it. He underscored the strategic importance of Pakistan for US plans in the region.

Responding to concerns expressed over growing Indian role in Afghanistan, the NSA said the US understood Pakistan’s sensitivities. Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani told the General Jones that ‘Pakistan is fully committed to taking its ongoing operations for clearing its territory of terrorists and extremists to their logical conclusion, although its forces are overstretched because of continuous tension on the country’s eastern border’. Gilani said it was imperative for the US to be sensitive about Pakistan’s core interests -- Kashmir, water, Indian military capability and the need for a balance of power in South Asia. He said the US would have to use its influence with India for resumption of ‘composite dialogue’ and easing tension with Pakistan to enable it to concentrate its attention and energy on the fight against militancy and terrorism. The American Security Adviser had suggested in a recent interview that an exit strategy could be on the cards. ‘But we also need a better plan with the allies to gradually turn over responsibility for the country to Afghan institutions and organizations in as short a time as possible.’

Early this year it was reported that the simmering discord between Washington and Islamabad came to a boil when the US ambassador to Pakistan publicly complained about harassment of American diplomatic personnel by Pakistani authorities and obliquely hinted that Islamabad risked losing US aid to projects if they continued to deny visas to US officials and space for the US mission to fulfill its multi-billion assistance program. Ambassador Anne Patterson’s warning was followed up by a rare public admonition of Pakistan from the US mission in Islamabad in which it expressed concern about the ''continued provocative actions and false allegations against US personnel working to implement the new partnership between the leaders of Pakistan and the United States.'' The wording of the statement suggested that the US believed there was a growing militaristic constituency in Pakistan that was now operating independently of the civilian government. One Pakistani newspaper “Nation," ran a Wall Street Journal correspondent out of the country by alleging he was a CIA agent, recalling the horrible tragedy which befell his predecessor Daniel Pearl.

In the same toxic spirit, hard-line sections in Pakistan have reportedly contrived to distort remarks by the Indian Army chief Deepak Kapoor that New Delhi has to prepare for a war under a nuclear overhang. In the most recent instance, Kapoor’s remarks about the need for India developing capability to fight a two-front war has been translated to ''Indian General threatens Pakistan and China with war.'' While a few Pakistani analysts have responded soberly to the new doctrines being discussed in New Delhi, most commentators, including current and former generals, diplomats, and analysts have reacted hysterically to what would be considered doctrinal deliberations in any mature society.

According to an Indian newspaper the idea behind the whipping up of mass hysteria against US and India in what is now being dubbed ''Paranoidistan'' appears to be a ploy by hard-line elements in Islamabad to disengage from fulfilling its bilateral and international obligations to tackle terrorist elements. With each terrorist incident, Pakistan is coming under increasing pressure from US to give up its obsession with the non-existent threat from India and focus on confronting its home-grown threats eating away at the country. The Pakistani military has signalled clearly that it does not subscribe to the US prescription, and General Kapoor’s outline of new Indian doctrines has come in handy for this escape act. After distorting Gen Kapoor’s remarks and generating a sulfurous discourse in the media, the Pakistani military high command and the civilian cabinet defence committee both met to assert that ''Pakistan would never allow its security to be jeopardized.'' Pakistan’s beleaguered president Asif Ali Zardari, under pressure from the army, also joined this military-ISI generated hysteria by promising a 1000-year confrontation with India over Kashmir. None of this escaped the attention of Washington, which dispatched yet another high-powered Congressional delegation led by former presidential candidate John McCain to talk to Pakistan. McCain was unrelenting in response to Pakistani protests against drone attacks, bluntly insisting that the ‘‘(drone) attacks are imperative to defeat the enemy,'' and ''with an improved decision making process the civilian causalities are totally minimized.'' The US delegation also heard protests from the Pakistani leadership about security measures introduced by Washington for screening Pakistani nationals among citizens of 13 other state sponsors of terrorism and ''countries of interest.'' But with new arrests in the Najibullah Zazi case and developments in the CIA forward base bombing case both revealing links to Pakistan; US threshold for Islamabad’s policies are diminishing and Pakistan is seen as a state sponsor of terrorism in all but formal designation. In fact, Pakistan – or Paranoidistan, as some Indian officials refer to it in private – becomes the immediate focus of attention after any terrorist attack, including ones like the Christmas Day bombing attempt of an airplane in Detroit, where there was no immediate Pakistani link. ''The fact that this particular person was not trained in Pakistan does not change the fact that the inspiration for all of this comes from al-Qaida, and al-Qaida's leadership is based in the remotest areas on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border,’’

Pakistan anger and frustration was further increased by the demands of the Western leaders that India be given a seat in the solution of the Afghanistan problem. In January British PM Gordon Brown spoke of his belief that India has a major role to play in Afghanistan.” In saying neighbours should come together, there was probably a hint to Pakistan that it should stop dragging its feet on an enhanced role for India in Afghanistan. Islamabad has been rather uncomfortable about India's $1.3 billion aid to its western neighbour and the work India is engaged in much lauded by the British government in the realms of reconstruction and developing infrastructure in Afghanistan, not to mention the re-opening of Indian consulates in that country and India's growing popularity makes it increasingly insecure for Pakistan.

Pakistan's despondency been reflected in its ambivalence towards the Afghan Taliban, which it sees as an asset if and when western troops pull out of Afghanistan, which, according to US President Barak Obama, will begin in August 2011. Brown, however, signalled that there were elements within the Afghan Taliban, who were mercenaries. He saw scope in co-opting them back into the mainstream. In March this year India accused Pakistan of harboring 42 terror camps that are "still active” and that lack of a serious attempt or effort by that country to dismantle them. Indian Defence minister A K Antony also said India did not expect a "miracle" from the resumption of Indo-Pak talks which concluded recently at the foreign secretary-level here noting it was just a beginning. He also said the recent Indo-Pak talks could not be considered a failure as this was just a beginning and no miracles were expected from this effort.

Indian Defence Minister also made light of the recent threat by Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) Chief Hafiz Saaed against India. Notwithstanding the recent Indo-Pak foreign secretary-level meeting for which India took initiative, JuD chief Hafiz Mohd Saeed has said that Pakistan will have to "fight a war at all costs" if New Delhi is not prepared to hold talks. Saeed denied accusations about his involvement in planning and carrying out the Mumbai attacks. He exhorted people to go to Kashmir for jihad against India. Hafiz Saaed called Pakistan government “cowardly". Saeed’s comments came days after the foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan held talks in New Delhi on February 25, the first official parleys between the two sides since the Mumbai attacks. Though there was no breakthrough in the talks, the world community welcomed the development in the hope that it would lead to normalization of ties between the two countries. Saeed, also the founder of the banned LeT, was placed under house arrest in Lahore in December 2008 after the JuD was declared a terrorist group by the UN Security Council in the wake of the Mumbai terror attacks. He was freed after about six months on the orders of the Lahore HC. The Pakistan government challenged his release in the Supreme Court, but no hearing has been held in the matter for several months after the case was adjourned for various reasons.
One factor that has to be taken into consideration is India’s absence and consequent diplomatic weakness in the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC). In OIC Summits and ICFMs resolution on Kashmir and the state of Muslims in India are routinely adopted along the lines drafted by Pakistan. It remains to be seen how India is going to counter Pakistani diplomatic offensive once India starts selective strikes against India-specific terrorists living in Pakistan. Unless the scale of conflict is increased by Pakistan India would be well advised to keep in proportionality principle and not act as Israel is doing in occupied territory. But before India embarks on extra-territorial military venture she should garner international support and if possible that of UNSC, in all possibility it would be vetoed by China, so that international community is convinced that global peace and security cannot be guaranteed without taking care of, what Bruce Riedel calls “the epicenter” of international terrorism.

For the residents of this region Indo-Pak rivalry remains a fact of life despite the fact that India of 1947 and of today are vastly different in population, economic and military strength, and has been given a seat in the G-20 that has replaced the G-8, a board for managing the politico-economic developments of the world. Though it is doubtful if all the members of G-20 are competent to shoulder this responsibility undoubtedly the elevation to this group, with the possibility of elevation to a still higher and exclusive international club, has given India the confidence to manage the instability in the South Asian region. But refusal to accept India’s new found elevated position coupled with being a nuclear nation reminds one of George Kennan’s containment policy, fleshed out in the Truman Doctrine, to arrest the spread of communism in Europe through Marshall Plan and the creation of NATO. Harry Truman reasoned that containment was necessary so that free people are not subjugated by totalitarian regimes. This imperfect analogy can be compared with al-Qaeda and Taliban brand of Islamic extremism that can also be comparable to President Dwight Eisenhower’s apocalypse management of an implacable enemy in the shape of communism, seen by Eisenhower as a permanent fact of international life( he could not have foreseen the demise of communism) that had to be contained and managed.

In the case of assistance to India by the US Barak Obama could take recourse of Nixon Doctrine, announced under the shadow of Vietnam War, calling upon US allies to take care of their military defense but that US aid would be given as requested. Undeniably Truman and Nixon Doctrine and Eisenhower “Apocalypse Management” and the present day fight against Islamic extremists have different context. Yet the choice of permanently living under the threat of terrorism that has lost global support and particularly in the Islamic world, and assuming that some countries will eventually have to live under theocratic rule it stands to logic that the international community should cut its losses when there is still time and stop dreaming that Western type of democracy can be effected in all countries. Samuel Huntington’s first, second and third wave of democracy testifies to the fact that conditions have to be made possible for democratic institutions to sustain. Till then the international community should ensure that duty to protect and duty to prevent endorsed by the UN Summit and the civilized code of behaviour is practised by all countries of the world.

(The writer is a former Ambassador and Secretary of Bangladesh)