Afghanistan Revisited
By Kazi Anwarul Masud
Henry Kissinger’s article in Washington Post (24 June 2010) appears to reflect a strand of thinking on Afghanistan that is gaining ground in the US and elsewhere.
Kissinger writes that the premise of an Afghan government taking over security responsibility from the US enabling it to start withdrawal in July 2011 do not reflect Afghan realities and the deadline is not realistic. He argues that the Afghans have never been pacified by foreign forces and difficult terrain coupled with fierce senses of autonomy of the people stands in the way of strong central government in Kabul. Tribal societal structure with embedded primordial loyalties is unlikely to deliver a transparent and responsive government that the US and her allies expect of President Karzai. Kissinger describes Afghanistan as a nation and not a state in conventional sense and hence the attainable outcome is likely to be a semi-autonomous regions based on ethnicity, no American counterinsurgency strategy can alter this reality.
Afghanistan has been in global focus since 9/11. Sacking of General Stanley McChrystal from his command in Afghanistan by President Obama over the contemptuous comments he made in an interview in Rolling Stone magazine renewed public attention on, described by New York Time (NYT), “an unpopular war”. NYT also detected President Obama’s deliberative, openness to debate but finally coldly decisive nature of his decision making process by examining the time taken between the President’s first reading of the Rolling Stone article and his acceptance of the resignation of General McChrystal.
Some have compared the sacking by President Truman of General McArthur with that of Stanley McChrystal. The moot point here is that distinct from many developing countries where duly elected governments are thrown out through military coup d’etat, in countries wedded to democracy civilian control over the military is never questioned. In this case despite Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ warning to President Obama that McChrystal’s ouster could be highly disruptive and affect continuity, momentum and relations with allies, sacking of General McChrystal was never in doubt.
The problem of finding a successor in General David Patraeus is thought to be correct not only due to his across party line support in the US Congress but also due to his familiarity with the political intricacies of Balkan and Iraq wars and his understanding of international politics and easy ability to interact with Hamid Karzai and regional powers. Added to this is his qualified support for July next year troop’s withdrawal that he described as “beginning of a process of transition that is condition-based”. President Obama himself reiterated that withdrawal would be open to debate and he expects that by July next year Afghan government to take on more and more responsibility.
There is a growing consensus in the US Senate Armed Services Committee that US administration’s timeline for withdrawal may undermine the success of the NATO mission in Afghanistan. It may be prudent to remind ourselves of Henry Kissinger’s warning that the US has a basic national interest in preventing “Jihadist Islam from gaining additional momentum, which it will surely do if it can claim to have defeated the US and its allies after overcoming the Soviet Union. A precipitate withdrawal would weaken governments in many countries with significant Islamic minorities”.
What then is the US to do? It is crystal clear that the Taliban are not going away. Reportedly the US may consider accelerated efforts by Karzai government to reconcile with the leaders of the Taliban insurgency. There are also reports (NYT-24 JUNE 2010) of Pakistan army chief and ISI chief’s visits to Kabul and of their agreement with Hamid Karzai’s assessment that the US cannot win in Afghanistan and in a post war Afghanistan power should be shared with Sirajuddin Haqqani group, an ally of Al-Qaeda and a long time Pakistani asset.
Though some in Obama administration have not ruled out Haqqani group from an eventual settlement provided they separate the group from Al-Qaeda, a doubtful proposition given the two’s long time collaboration, a separate peace between Pakistan and Afghanistan without guaranteeing US demand of denying haven to Al-Qaeda would be politically unacceptable to the West and to other regional powers.
Additionally Pak army chief had reportedly offered to broker a deal with Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Omar and Karzai government. These efforts are mainly aimed at reducing Indian “influence” in Afghanistan and ensure that Afghanistan remains as a place for strategic depth in case of Indo-Pak conflict.
Al Jazeera television recently reported a face-to-face meeting between Hamid Karzai and Sirajuddin Haqqani accompanied by high ranking Pakistani army official causing deep unease among Afghan minorities-Tajik, Hazara and Uzbek communities who make up almost half the population of Afghanistan. Reasons behind the talks could be Karzai’s lack of confidence in NATO’s continued presence in his country and his long held desire to restore the dominance of the ethnic Pashtuns who have ruled the country for generations. Pakistan’s interest in bolstering the Haqqani group is to ensure the group’s continued anti-Indian terrorist activities. Haqqani group is believed to be behind the attacks on Indian embassy and other facilities in Kabul.
Americans are believed to have told Pakistan and Karzai that Haqqani group should be “off-limit” and any deal with this group would drive a wedge between the US and Karzai government. Both the US President and his CIA chief Leon Panetta are skeptical about such reintegration and reconciliation efforts. Panetta reportedly takes a bleaker view of Pakistan initiated talks due to his firm conviction that the Taliban would not change color and would try to take over once they get a chance at a power sharing arrangement. A leader of the Uzbeks warned that Karzai was giving back the country to the Taliban thus inviting civil war and possible split of the country. Additionally the opposition of former Presidential candidate Abdullah Abdullah of Pashtun and Tajik heritage who draws his power from the Tajiks of Karzai’s policy of engagement with Taliban and Pakistan should be taken note of.
It is difficult to imagine a South Korean and Japanese situation where the US armed forces have continued to remain for more than fifty years will also happen in the case of Afghanistan. Besides historian Paul Kennedy’s “imperial stretch,” a war fatigue is bound to come about particularly among the allies who have contributed armed personnel to Afghan war and the reluctance of the US Congress to finance ad infinitum a country where corruption is rampant. Yet it is difficult to imagine any US President withdrawing from Afghanistan without totally destroying the toxic elements among the Taliban that can launch terrorist activities on Western soil.
From South Asian region’s point of view US military presence in Afghanistan should be supported to put a lid on Islamist extremism that afflicts many countries of this region.
(The writer is a former Ambassador and Secretary of Bangladesh.)
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