Basis For Indian Response To Mumbai Carnage
Guest Column by Kazi Anwarul Masud
(The views expressed by the author are his own)
Mumbai terrorist attacks brings anew the question of the depth of commitment of Pakistan in combating terrorism by refusing to recognize the distinction that Pakistan allegedly makes between “good” terrorists who are involved in terrorism in India and “bad” terrorists who are Taliban fighting Pakistani forces.
Pakistani scholar Parvez Hoodbhoy (Foreign Affairs-Nov/Dec 2004) had posed an enigmatic question: can Pakistan work? Such a question could appropriately be asked of countries standing on the brink of “failure” defined as a state unable to function as a responsible member of the international community. But can Pakistan be categorized as falling into such a group even if the most expansive definition of a “failed state” is taken into account? Stephen Cohen, the highly credentialed and perhaps the leading American analyst on South Asia, (The nation and the State of Pakistan) has quoted Pakistanis who acknowledged Pakistan’s failure as a state several times in the past, most notably in 1971 when East Pakistan became Bangladesh. Cohen considered Pakistan as “a case study of negativesa state seemingly incapable of establishing a normal political system, supporting radical Islamic Taliban, and mounting Jihadi operations into India while its own economic and political systems were collapsing and internal religious and ethnic based violence were rising dramatically”.
Bruce Riedel (of the Brookings Institution), an advisor to Barak Obama had described Pakistan as the most dangerous country in the world where “ the forces that threaten global peace and security all come together: proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the risk of nuclear war, terrorism, poverty, radical Islam and narcotics”. Hussein Haqqani (of Carnegie Endowment of International Peace- The role of Islam in Pakistan’s future) and now Pakistani ambassador in the US saw Pakistan’s weakness being embedded in disproportionate focus on ideology, military capability and external alliance since the country’s inception in 1947.
Pakistan’s progress has been faltering not only in its inability to build up institutions supportive of democracy but also in other areas compared to its nemesis India. Pakistan’s economy is the smallest among the nuclear powers. Pakistan suffers from massive urban unemployment, rural underemployment, illiteracy and low per capita income. But perhaps Pakistan’s greatest weakness stems from its inability to acquire a clear identity as a nation –state bereft of transnational Islamic ideology. Stephen Cohen finds the “history and future of Pakistan being rooted in this duality, a complex relationship between Pakistan the state and Pakistan the nation mission bound to serve as a beacon for oppressed and backward Muslim communities elsewhere in the world”.
In the case of Pakistan its obsession with Islamic ideology was a direct result of its pathological fear of India which led to the country being ruled by an establishment described by Stephen Cohen as a “moderate oligarchy” consisting of the military, civil service, judiciary and landed aristocracy. This oligarchy believes in implacable opposition to Indian preeminence, fight for the “liberation” of Kashmir, maintenance of nuclear weapons as a deterrence to Indian “designs” and as a status symbol, implicit belief in social Darwinism and consequent contempt for land reforms, closest possible relationship with the US despite anti-US sentiment among the general public, and use of Islam as the national unifier and as a force to deter Pashtoon, Sindhi and Baluch sub-nationalism. In this conglomeration of oligarchic forces the army from the beginning pronounced its dominance over the others. But since the army alone could not rule Pakistan it needed collusive cooperation of other self-interested parties. When the intensity of the Cold War was on the wane Soviet invasion of Afghanistan came as a God-sent blessing for General Ziaul-ul-Huq who based Pakistani educational and legal system on Islamic law and formalized the state ideology as an official policy of Islamization. Through his Islamization efforts Zia made Pakistan an important ideological and organizational center of global Islamist movement including its role in the anti-Soviet campaign in Afghanistan by allowing Afghan mujahedeens to operate from bases in Pakistan and sponsoring the Taliban putsch for power in Afghanistan by dislodging the Soviet backed regimes. Little did the Americans realize at that time that they were being instrumental in constructing a Frankenstein who at a later date would be responsible for the 9/11 carnage in the US mainland. In a testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee a senior State Department official characterized Pakistan as “probably the most anti-American country in the world right now”. Leon Haader of the Cato Institute advised Washington to view Pakistan, with its failed economy, and insecure nuclear arsenal “as a reluctant supporter of US goals at best and as a potential long term problem at worst”. Political analyst Matt Thundyll compared the US policy of cooperation with Pakistan as an alliance with a lesser evil against a greater evil. In reality, wrote Thundyll, like the Soviet threat in 1945 the Pakistani threat is extant. While in the case of the former it was Communism in Pakistan’s case it is Islamic extremism.
Bush National Security Strategy (NSS) of September 2002 document declared among other aims that “The US national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests”. President Bush addressing the US Congress in the aftermath of the nine-eleven events announced that henceforth US relations with other countries would be judged by whether they are “for us or against us” in the war against terrorism. Bush’s doctrine of preemption expanded the relatively non-controversial concept of true preemption, allowed under the UN Charter which could be legitimized if under taken against an imminent, specific, near certain attack. The most basic reference to legality of any war under the UN Charter is under articles 42 and 51either one is acting in self-defense or acting under the authority of the UNSC. Professor Michael Walzer of Princeton University and the author of the seminal work JUST AND UNJUST WAR expounded six propositions while discussing his theory of aggression. His propositions included the existence of an international society of independent states; the international society has law establishing rights of its members particularly rights of territorial integrity and sovereignty; any use of force or imminent threat of force by one state against the political sovereignty or territorial integrity of another state constituted aggression and would be a criminal act; aggression was justified by two kinds of violent response: a war of self-defense by the victim and any other member of the international society; nothing but aggression can justify war; and once the aggressor has been militarily repulsed it can also be punished. Walzer argues that as with domestic crimes, use of force would require actual or imminent boundary crossing, invasion and physical assault. Otherwise resistance to aggression would have no determinate meaning. He emphasizes that a wrong must be received by the victim for him to take recourse to force. Wlazerian concept presupposes war between states which was also in the minds of the framers of the UN Charter. They could not have foreseen the devastating role played by non-state actors; the problem of failing and failed states; and the technological nature of the threat. One can therefore find some relief in the assertion by Condoleezza Rice that preemption is not a new concept and that there could be no moral or legal justification for a country to wait to be attacked before it can address the existential threat. The UN General Assembly in 1965 adopted a Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in Domestic Affairs of States and Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty provided that “no State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist, or armed activities ... or interfere in civil strife in another country”. The heart of the Declaration is not so much against intervention as against harboring terrorists for doing harm to another country. As paralysis in the UNSC is possible, demonstrated by the inability of the Council to agree on the US request for military action against Saddam regime however controversial the request might have been, one can depend on the exception provided in article 51 of the UN Charter that “nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of the individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations”. Article 2(4) of the Charter prohibiting use of force is not applicable if “territorial integrity” and “political independence” of the country so intervened are not affected. Armed response can also be supported as per the preamble of the Charter that provides for “respect for the obligations arising from Treaties and other sources of international law”. It has also been argued that individual nations or collectively can take actions because self-defense is an integral part of a nation to live in peace and without fear. Besides if actions have to be taken with the consent of the UNSC alone then what happens if the UNSC fails to agree on preventive measures or if actions cannot be taken because the perpetrators are not members of he UN but are non-state actors. It is not expected that an aggressed nation will continue to tolerate to be inflicted by the aggressor till such time the UN can make up its mind on the measures to be taken.
In Mumbai case US Secretary of State has unequivocally stated that Pakistan was involved in the attacks though the US did not think that Pak government was involved. Ms Rice refused to comment when asked whether the US backed India’s demand that Pakistan should hand over the three suspects Dawood Ibrahim, Tiger Memon and Maulana Masood Azharto India. Pakistan may refuse the Indian demand on grounds that proof against their complicity has not been given to Pakistan and also because of absence of extradition treaty between the two countries. Meanwhile former ISI chief General Hamid Gul told Pakistani press that India wanted him to be handed over as well and that the US wanted him to be included the list of individuals or organizations linked with al-Qaeda and Taliban. It is realized by all, particularly by South Asians, about the danger of an armed conflict between India and Pakistan. But then one has to consider the state sponsored terrorism long carried out by Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir, attack on Parliament building, bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul and many other terrorist acts, and the cumulative effects of these acts on Indian politico-economic sectors before advising India to restrain herself. India being a democracy cannot be immune to popular sentiments that cry out for governmental response to Mumbai carnage.
Having said all these India would be best advised to make cost-benefit analysis before taking any irreversible action against Pakistan and her ability to withstand the reactions that would emanate from her actions. In any case South Asia must be rid of terrorism in all its forms for good. Our economic development still largely mired in poverty demands peace and stability in the region.
(The Writer is a former Secretary and Ambassador of Bangladesh. He can be reached at kamasud@dhaka.net)
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