Af-Pak Conundrum
By Kazi Anwarul Masud
There are two basic propositions in this essay.
The first is that despite the struggle against the al-Qaeda in Afghanistan a day will come when the US will be faced with Vietnam syndrome (totally discounted by President Obama in his West Point speech on 1st December on grounds of legitimacy of Afghan war given by the international community, unlike Vietnam the US is not facing a broad based insurgency, and unlike Vietnam Americans were viciously attacked in the US homeland from Afghanistan).
One may recall that President Reagan suggested that Americans could have defeated the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese Army, alleging that the American public had turned against the war due to the influence of North Vietnamese propaganda, and implying that the Johnson and Nixon administrations had been "afraid ... to win" the war in Vietnam. Reagan equated the "Vietnam syndrome" not only with a reluctance on the part of the American public to support US military interventions, but also with feelings of guilt about the devastation brought about due to the Vietnam War and with feelings of doubt over the morality of America's intentions and actions during the war( Wikipedia).
A day may come when the American people will get tired of young men and women being killed in a war in a far flung area that had never for centuries seen anything remotely liberal progressiveness or modernity as is generally understood and practised. Hamid Karzai’s reelection to the Presidency has been questioned by the UN and the powers that have propped his regime and the US has now pledged conditional support to his regime. His brother, governor of a province, is accused of all possible criminal acts that a thug can commit.
Besides Afghanistan has no minerals to attract the Western entrepreneurs nor strategic importance that would convince the American soldiers to bunker down in a God forsaken land. If the US is not considering an exit strategy, then an endless military engagement would not make any sense in the long run. Professor Rory Stewart in his testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee said that Obama strategy of building a stable government in Afghanistan was impossible because, he thought , it was highly unlikely that the US would be able to build a legitimate state in Afghanistan or defeat the Taliban. He strongly opposed troop increase and a total fight. He proposed reduction of troop level from the current level of 90000 to far fewer with the international community focussing on the twin objective of development and counterinsurgency.
This position is different from that of General Stanley McChrystal who would like to have additional 40000 troops who will fight their way into areas of large population where Taliban currently operate. The NATO troops would drive the Taliban out of those areas, fracture the Taliban and encourage defections that would give hope to the Afghans that the Americans can be relied upon and extend cooperation to the NATO forces. Stanley McChrystal also plans to reduce air strikes to contain civilian casualties.
The question, however, remains whether such expectation would materialize or indeed if such a policy is at all necessary to safeguard US national interest assuming the al-Qaeda would not venture to attack US and Western interests after the US response to the carnage of 9/11 and given the belief that al-Qaeda is now disjointed lacking a central command and the video speeches to destroy the “Western infidels” are mere propaganda. On the other hand the daily terrorist acts in Pakistan by Islamic extremists testify to their growing strength to destabilize the democratically elected government that the Taliban do not consider to be Islamic enough and seek its replacement to establish a Caliphate. But the cross border terrorism in India is not so much for the sake of Islam as it is more to destabilize the preeminent enemy-the Hindu India-a country that has defeated Pakistan in three wars and is now considered a global power.
The second proposition is that since the birth of Pakistan was on religious ground and successive regimes in that country believes Pakistan as the place of last resort for ‘distressed Muslims’ Islamization of Pakistan is inevitable, and perhaps this will lead to Talibization or to a form of extremist Islamic rule and the supremacy of Sharia law in the governance of the country. Under this scenario Pakistan will pose a threat to international peace and security and a heaven for the Taliban whom the Pakistan army is now fighting in the tribal areas. While leading South Asian analyst Stephen Cohen considers Pakistan as “a case study of negatives-a state seemingly incapable of establishing normal political system, supporting radical Islamic Taliban, and mounting Jihadi operations into India while its own economic and political systems were collapsing and internal religious and ethnic based violence were rising dramatically”
Hussein Haqqani( presently Pakistan ambassador to the US) sees Pakistan’s weakness being embedded in disproportionate focus on ideology, military capability and external alliance since the country’s inception in 1947and Ashley Tellis( of Carnegie Foundation) considers “Pakistan is clearly both part of the problem and the solution to the threat of terrorism facing the United States”. Added is Leon Haader’s (of Cato Institute) warning to Washington to view Pakistan “as a reluctant supporter of US goals at best and as a potential long term problem at worst”. In such a scenario it is possible that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons will fall into the hands of religious extremists with incalculable consequences for the world.
This perception of threat to global security presupposes Islamic extremists’ hatred of Western civilization that concurs with Samuel Huntington’s thesis that “civilization will be increasingly important in the future and the world will be shaped in large measure by the interaction among seven or eight civilizations”. This re emergence of civilizational consciousness is deeply associated with disillusionment with liberal progressiveness. Historian Bernard Lewis would like to explain the conflict between Islam and Judeo-Christian civilizations as the defeat of the Muslims at the hands of the latter. Added to these factors, controversial as these are because of binary position placed of two great religions-Islam versus Christianity- is the undying enmity of Pakistan towards India. Under no circumstances would Pakistan acquiesce with Indian primacy in South Asia. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s “thousand years war against India” and his determination to acquire nuclear weapons even if Pakistanis had to eat grass remains an article of faith with Pakistanis who deeply believe in Indian ‘conspiracy’ for an Akhand Bharat to materialize eventually.
The possibility of danger of nuclear weapons in Pakistani hands has been revealed in Seymour Hirsch’s article in The New Yorker (In an unstable Pakistan can nuclear warheads be kept safe-16.11.09) that extensively explored President Obama’s concern over the fragility of the Pak civilian government and the US’ concern of transfer of some nuclear assets, not to the Taliban, but to extremists in Pak military establishment by staging a coup d’etat. Despite denial by Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mullen of secret negotiations that would allow specially trained American units to provide added security for the Pakistani arsenal in case of a crisis, Seymour Hirsch writes that Hizbul Tahrir, a Sunni extremist organization determined to establish the Caliphate, has made inroads into Pak army. In reply to Pakistani argument that the officers are not only professionals but are also trained in England it has been argued that indoctrination of Islamist ideology takes place, according to an official of Obama administration, “ in services every Friday for Army officers, and at corps and unit meetings where they are addressed by senior commanders and clerics”.
The question however remains as to what should be done even if nuclear Pakistan were to be Talibanized. Should the world repeat Bush’s doctrine of preemption with predictable disaster or remain satisfied with a 21st century version of Chamberlain’s Munich Agreement that Hitler reportedly asked Von Ribbentrop to tear up the document as Chamberlain left for Britain?
One should also take into consideration that Pakistan is neither Afghanistan nor Saddam Hussein’s Iraq to be treated lightly. President Bush?s invasion of Iraq had been seen by many in the Islamic world as a war against Islam and has devalued the US as the fountainhead of democracy and the unquestioned global leader not because of its hard power but for the ideals the US had stood for ever since seventeenth century, and more particularly in the last century. Bush’s use of hard power failed because the world used to authoritarian and coercive form of leadership of earlier military-industrial eras had in post industrial era changed to softer, persuasive and inspiring leadership style.
Bush’s failure is not that of Austrian leader Metternich who was compared by Henry Kissinger to Don Quixote, a man of genius out of touch with his contemporaries, unable to convince his contemporaries of his vision and ultimately forced to accept the “doctrinaire of status quo” nor of President Woodrow Wilson’s failure, argues Kissinger, that was caused by the pressure of domestic politics that opposed at that time Wilsonian ideals as utopian. So suggests Kissinger, a statesman must not only contend with a shifting and unstable world but also with colleagues who lack his sophisticated view (Henry Kissinger’s philosophy of history-Thomas J Noer).
Therefore, though ideally if Pakistan were to turn to Islamic extremism the world has to tread softly with a combination of hard and soft powers. It is difficult to believe that Pakistan army messes and civilian clubs where wine was favored over water has over the last sixty years totally abjured alcohol, among others, and taken to strict Islamic laws as the basis of their regulatory behavior. The point is not to advertise the benefits of wine consumption to stave off heart attack but to try to understand the societal change that Pakistan might have undergone. But then increase of Islamic extremism possibly has taken place as the successive army rulers exploited and encouraged the Islamic parties to fill the vacuum of secular politics that the army displaced. Given the fact that army ruled most of post-independence Pakistan and General Ziaul Huq’s Islamic xenophobia , aided by the US assistance to displace the Soviets from Afghanistan, Pakistan society, partly pre-modern, has perhaps shifted towards Islamism. The role the madrasa (religious school) education plays in Pakistan coupled with anti-female education campaign carried out by the Taliban but acquiesced by a part of the society has played a significant role in the societal transformation in the country. Despite the seemingly secular character of the civilian government of President Zardari one has to take into account the domestic compulsions that led the NWFP government to enter into agreement with Baitullah Meshud?s (now deceased) Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan over Swat valley.
A Stanley Foundation report states “The 21st century is imposing new pressures on the nonproliferation regime from several directions. The NPT was never designed to deal with the rising danger of nuclear terrorism and Al Qaeda has stated that obtaining nuclear weapons is a priority goal.” Terrorist organizations have proven that they can operate globally, plan quietly, and inflict devastating damage. Pakistan has been called the most dangerous nuclear state in the world.
That is likely an exaggeration and President Obama stated in April that he was confident that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal was being adequately secured by its army. But the terrorist activity in that country, especially attacks on military personnel and the Rawalpindi headquarters, and in Afghanistan, provides good reason for continuing concern. To its credit, Pakistan has taken important steps over the last decade to improve its nuclear security and command and control processes. Pakistan has also been cooperating with the United States on improving its nuclear and border security since 2001. The United States has provided over $100 million for these initiatives. While this work was begun under Presidents Bush and Musharraf, it remains a high priority under the Obama administration. The US dialogue with Pakistan is facing challenges, which are particularly acute when high-profile charges of nuclear insecurity in Pakistan arise in the Western press. This raises questions of trust between the two and Pakistan is especially sensitive to any suggestion that the United States might seek to remove its nuclear weapons in a crisis. Rather than focus on removal, there should be a dialogue with the Pakistani military and civilian leaders on how United States and NATO Special Forces in Afghanistan could assist with nuclear asset security in an emergency. One additional way to regain this trust is to widen the nuclear dialogue beyond the security issue and discuss the possible resumption of civil nuclear discussions with Pakistan. This could eventually establish the political and technical basis for a criteria-based civil nuclear cooperation agreement that could better integrate Pakistan into the non proliferation regime (securing vulnerable nuclear materials-Stanley Foundation-November 2009).
A related event is President Asif Ali Zardari?s handing over control of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal to Prime Minister Gilani in an apparent bid to ease political pressure. According to analysts the move was to placate political and military critics, as an amnesty protecting Mr. Zardari from possible prosecution from National Reconciliation Ordinance expired. The amnesty gave him and several others immunity from corruption charges. It is doubtful if the transfer of nuclear command would necessarily assuage international concern over Pak nuclear assets falling into “wrong hands” defined as usurpation of national authority by domestic militants or by sociopath hard core India haters who would start a nuclear war with India irrespective of disastrous consequences for Pakistan itself.
In order to avoid this armageddon the international community has to think ahead of preventive measures that can be taken. The situation becomes serious in the light of the report that Pakistan faces a "demographic disaster" if its leaders fail to invest in a youth population that is disturbingly cynical about democracy. The report, commissioned by the British Council, said Pakistan is at the crossroads and its younger generation is losing faith in democracy. The report says that the nuclear-armed country is at a critical point, with its population forecast to swell by 85 million, from its current 180 million, over the next two decades. Half of Pakistan's population is aged fewer than 20, with two-thirds still to reach their 30th birthday. But they are deeply divided about how the country should be run. Only a third believes democracy is the best system of governance, one third support sharia law, while 7 per cent think dictatorship is a good idea.
An Indian newspaper reports that a majority of Pakistanis see the United States as a greater threat to their country than traditional arch-rival India or the dreaded Taliban. According to Gallup Pakistan's poll, 59% of more than 2,700 people surveyed across the country consider the US a threat. "Eighteen percent believe India is the threat while 11% say the Taliban are a threat. The survey findings show that some of the most vocal anti-Taliban groups were equally opposed to the US. Some Pakistanis believe that if the US is committed to eradicating militancy, it should try to solve the Kashmir issue to help Islamabad move its troops from the eastern border with India to fight the Taliban in the northwest. The poll group said Pakistanis were suspicious that Washington was working to control Islamabad's strategic assets. The poll revealed that a majority of Pakistanis support the offensive against the Taliban in their stronghold of South Waziristan, but more people blame the US for the violence than the militia itself, which experts say poses an existential threat to Pakistan. The near-daily destabilizing attacks have convinced many that the offensive is necessary. Over 50% people support the offensive.
There is cautious support in Pakistani public opinion for the military action. Thirteen percent opposed the military action while 36% said they were unsure. While a majority supported the action, only 25% respondents said the Taliban were responsible for the offensive; 35% blamed the US while 31% pointed to the government. Thirty-six percent people thought the offensive would improve security while an almost equal section (37%) believed it would lead to deterioration, the poll found.
The research group said public opinion was still divided on whether or not Islamabad was fighting America's war, but in what could be a major relief to the increasingly unpopular federal government, many more consider it Pakistan's own war compared to a year ago. In the latest survey, 37% people considered it Pakistan's war while 39% saw it as America's war. Last year, only 23% of those questioned considered military action in the northwest to be Pakistan's war. This dissonance among the Pakistanis about the war being waged against the al-Qaeda, despite the seriousness displayed by the Pakistan army in its fight with the militants in South Waziristan, is likely to affect the outcome of the war as many of the soldiers still remain to be convinced of the validity of the war because they are either partly sympathetic to the al-Qaeda cause or they were helping the Taliban in their fight against the Soviets or were indoctrinated in Islamist ideology during Ziaul Huq’s and/or Musharraf regime. As army remains the most powerful organ in Pakistan the character of the army will determine the fate of Pakistan?s alliance with the US and the Western powers.
Meanwhile Hillary Clinton publicly stated that the US was not interested in staying in Afghanistan and has no long-term stake there. Clinton turned up the heat on Karzai over alleged widespread corruption in his administration. Washington expected Karzai to set up a major crimes tribunal and an anti-corruption commission and warned that millions of dollars of US civilian aid was contingent on seeing progress on graft. Karzai, for his part, has called on the West to do its part to clamp down on corruption.
Clinton provided a reminder that Obama was taking a very different approach than his predecessor, former President George W Bush, whose administration pledged to spread democracy in troubled regions of the world. She reiterated that primary focus remains on the security of the United States of America. Top White House advisor David Axelrod said that though an open-ended commitment cannot be made now, and the US wanted to do this in a way that maximizes its efforts against al-Qaida, but within the framework of bringing troops home at some point. Obama's decision has been complicated by the fraud-tainted elections in Afghanistan which saw Karzai re-elected to a second term. Differences have also emerged between key US figures on how to proceed with US ambassador to Kabul Karl Eikenberry expressing serious doubts about sending more troops before Karzai's government gets to grips with the corruption. The ambassador's position apparently put him at odds with Afghan war commander General Stanley McChrystal, who wants more than 40,000 extra US troops and has warned that without them the mission is likely to fail.
On 1st December President Barak Obama addressing the cadets at the West Point laid out his Afghan strategy defined “as disrupting, dismantling and defeating al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan and to prevent its capacity to threaten America and its allies in the future” because he is convinced that “our security is at stake in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This is the epicenter of violent extremism practiced by al-Qaeda. It is from here that we were attacked on 9/11, and it is from here that new attacks are being plotted” This is no idle danger; no hypothetical threat... And the stakes are even higher within a nuclear armed Pakistan because we know that al-Qaeda and other extremists seek nuclear weapons and we have every reason to believe that they would use them”. Following up on his Cairo speech President Obama described “al-Qaeda- a group of extremists who have distorted and defiled Islam, one of the world?s great religions” and the “Taliban-a ruthless, repressive and radical movement”.
Obama has reassured Pakistan that the US will remain “a strong supporter of Pakistan long after the guns have fallen silent so that the great potential of the people can be unleashed” Washington Post editorial (December 2, 2009) has described Obama?s decision to send more troops to Afghanistan as ?both correct and courageous: correct because it is the only way to prevent a defeat that would endanger this country and its vital interests and courageous because he is embarking on a difficult and costly mission that is opposed by a large part of his own party. New York Times Zeff Zeleny( Analyzing Obama’s Afghan speech) points out the conundrum to be faced by Pakistan as to how to convince the Pakistanis that the US will stay engaged even as Obama has set a goal for withdrawal.
Thomas Friedman (NYT-1ST DEC-THIS I BELIEVE) has disagreed with Obama’s decision to escalate in Afghanistan and suggested a minimalist approach working with the tribal leaders the way we did to overthrow the Taliban regime in the first place. Friedman is skeptical of US success because Afghanistan and the Muslim world suffer from deficit of freedom, education, and women’s empowerment. and also because Afghanistan cannot be turned into a nation-building project.
But Defense Secretary Robert Gates warned that the al-Qaeda would try to provoke a war between India and Pakistan with the aim to destabilize Pakistan and gain access to its nuclear weapons. This was supported by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and US Defense Chief Admiral Mullen. Secretary Gates added that in all cases the roots of the terrorists were traced back to the border areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The reality, he said, was that al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, placed more value on their affiliation with al-Qaeda in the FATA than linkages with any other organizations. The intent of the terrorists to seek nuclear weapons makes Pakistan the central focus of Af-Pak strategy.
According to Senator John Kerry what happens in Pakistan would do more to determine the outcome in Afghanistan than any increase in the number of troops. The centrality of Pakistan in the war against terrorism was thus unquestionably established. Anthony Cordesman (CSIS-THE AFGHAN STRATEGY CHECkLIST-NOV 2009) advised President Obama to ?make it clear that the ideological, demographic, governance, economic and other pressures that divide the Islamic world mean the world will face threats in many other nations that will endure indefinitely into the future. He should mention the risks in Yemen and Somalia, make clear that Iraq war is not over, and warn that we will face both a domestic threat and a combination of insurgency and terrorism that will continue to extend from Morocco to the Philippines, and Central Asia deep into Africa, regardless of how well we do in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
In the ultimate analysis it is difficult to foresee a victory in Afghanistan and Pakistan in the sense of obliteration of global terrorist threat and making the two countries responsible members of the international community. It is difficult to foresee Afghan economy and warlords abjuring poppy cultivation and replacing it with any other cash crop that will nearly compensate the farmers in their age old earning, as it is to see in Pakistan civilian government controlling the army and the general people convinced of the moral imperative of the NATO war against the Taliban. This war simply cannot be won. So the West and the US in particular has to strengthen and rely on Homeland Security, give assistance to eradicate poverty in the Muslim world, pressure their leaders to secularize the education system and pluralize their governance system while the countries of South Asia, particularly the Muslim majority ones, have to remain ever vigilant against Taliban and Taliban like terrorists taking roots pr getting sustenance within their territorial boundaries. Terrorism is indeed like the adverse effects of climate change-irreversible and deadly-like pandemic disease that has to be fought against on war footing yet unpredictable when it will again revisit the affected area.
(The writer is a former Secretary and Ambassador of Bangladesh)
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